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This study presents a conceptual framework and empirical farm-level model of
wealth creation and accumulation of the farm business and incorporates the changes in
life-cycle patterns in farmer productivity and consumption of the older and younger
generation. This method provides a vehicle to analyze the timing of farm transfer
initiation and its impact on the terminal wealth in the business and the likelihood of the
firm’s future continuity.
The results of a representative large grain farm (more than $250,000 in gross
sales, and $4 million in real estate) in Iowa confirm that the timing of a transfer is
determined by two major tradeoffs: 1) between the younger generation’s productivity
and consumption withdrawals and 2) between the firm’s growth and transfer taxes. Given
the age difference of the two generations (older and younger) used to populate the model
and their respective consumption levels, the firm has experienced a growth reduction
during the planning horizon. Therefore, the gain in productivity is much lower compared
to the loss of equity associated with additional consumption withdrawals.

Transfers made sooner in the life cycle are not encouraged when no off-farm
income is available and/or tax savings do not offset the firm’s reduced growth resulted
from an increase in consumption withdrawals. The preferred timing strategy is responsive
to the following factors: 1) availability of off-farm income (or level of equity withdrawals
for younger generation’s consumption), 2) the type of transition strategy (proactive or
regular), and 3) expected future farmland prices.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Recently the aging U.S. farmer population and the future of family farms have
been often discussed by academics, farming communities, lending institutions and policymakers. The 2012 Census of Agriculture indicates that about a third of all U.S. farmers
are beyond the traditional retirement age of 65 years old. The same group is attributed to
own about 29 percent of the real estate in the farm sector. An additional 29 percent of
farmers fall in the age group of 55 to 64, and own about 32 percent of farm real estate.
This evidence indicates that potentially more than half of U.S. farmers will exit
agriculture in the next 20 years. This number of retirements potentially triggers a shift in
ownership and management on an unprecedented scale in the farm sector (61 percent of
total real estate in the sector or $1.04 trillion) (USDA Agricultural Census 2012, USDA
Farm Income Team 2016).
Without appropriate transition planning these wealth transfers may be taxed at as
much as a 40 percent rate placing a significant financial burden on the business and its
continuity. Given the current wealth positions of many farm businesses, if the transfer is
not managed appropriately, it could result in the loss of personal wealth and reduced
business growth which may ultimately undermine its financial performance and reduce
the likelihood of its future continuity. The transition process also has implications on the
sectoral level (i.e. by altering the structure, dynamics and/or performance of that sector).
This study focuses solely on farm-level implications. A different modelling approach is
required to estimate the effect of these transfers at other levels and is left for another time
and/or for other researchers.
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The majority of farms in the U.S. are family-owned operations 1 making the farm
transition process critical to the future of these businesses. Retiring farmers like all
business owners have choices regarding their exit strategy. Several strategies often
considered include: (1) sell the farm to an outside (non-family) entity, (2) retire from
active production and rent the businesses assets until their demise and then bequeath it to
the younger generation (possible absentee landlords in the future), or (3) transfer the farm
to the younger generation and maintain the farm/business in their family. This work
relates to the third choice, the farm businesses transition to next the generation and
continued farming operations.
A closer look into farmer and farm demographics sheds light on why we
narrowed the focus of this work: about 23 percent of farm operators who fall in the age
group 55 or older operate businesses with production value of $250,000 or more and real
estate value greater than $5 million. The remaining farming population in this age group
are classified as small, “retirement” or “recreational” farmers.
The recreational and retirement farmers are most likely to select the first or
second exit strategy since the typical size of these operations cannot by themselves
support multiple generations.
Owners of large or very large farm businesses of this age group generally claim
agriculture production as their full-time occupation, with many of them having a strong
wealth position with a strong attachment to “their” land and the way of life. Farmers with
this disposition are very likely to use the third exit strategy. Statistical evidence shows the

1

According to the 2012 Census of Agriculture, 97 percent of all U.S. farms are family operations.

3

share of large-scale family operations remained relatively stable between 1989 and 2003 2
(between 5.9 and 7.1 percent of total U.S. farms). This fact indicates that large-scale
family farms have had a tendency to transfer the farm business to the younger generation
rather than using some other exit strategy (Structure and Finances of U.S. Farms 2005).
From the financial perspective, the transfer process is of a greater concern for
these large or very large farm businesses. This is true since these farms generally have
strong wealth positions and are therefore likely to have a higher tax burden and other
related financial obligations (e.g., buying out siblings’ portion of inheritance) upon
transfer. For this reason, this research focuses on understanding the financial impacts of
the timing of the farm transfer initiation on the terminal wealth in the farm business.
This work is an exposition in economics and does not address any of the so-called
“soft” issues associated with the complex nature of human relationships relating to the
operation and/or transfer of the farm business. For our purposes it is assumed that both
generations agree on the continuity of the family farm business as their mutual goal,
where the successor is known. The timing of the farm transfer initiation is the focus of
this work and is viewed as the crucial determinant of the financial performance of the
business and its future continuity. The decision to initiate the business transfer affects the
flow of earnings and power to make financial decisions related to income generation,
consumption, and equity accumulation.
The timing of the farm transfer initiation is affected by:

2

The change in the farm typology that took place in 2013 makes the comparison of this statistic difficult
across years (prior and after the change in typology). Many farms that used to be classified as large-scale
prior to the change in typology moved down to the midsize farm category in the updated farm typology
classification (Hoppe and MacDonald 2013).
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Trade-offs between firm’s growth and potential tax implications at the time of
transfer.



Life-cycle patterns in family consumption and farmer productivity and their
impact on the firm’s growth.
Under current tax laws, the federal estate tax, up to 40 percent, is applied to the

estate transfers that exceed the exemption amount of $5.45 million for an individual
(Internal Revenue Code, 2016). While this number may at first glance seem high, recent
escalation in farmland values, ever increasing farm size and technology investments
needed to remain competitive in agriculture production systems make it likely that an
ever increasing number of farms will meet or exceed the current tax exemption limits.
Farm businesses, by nature of the production process, have large asset bases comprising
of real estate (80 percent) and machinery (8 percent) both of which are relatively
indivisible and lack liquidity (Kirkpatrick 2013, USDA Farm Income Team 2016).
Recently, the period between 2007 and 2014 has been referred to as a “second golden age
in agriculture” during which the economic environment created conditions for the further
strengthening of wealth positions in farm businesses (Young, 2015). Record high farm
income and low interest rates during this period have triggered a rise in farmland prices
and supported large capital investments in farm technology, machinery and equipment.
Finally, the size of large and very large operations have been increasing over time since
well-established seasoned farmers generally have a strong borrowing capacity to grow
their asset bases, in particular increasing farmland in their investment portfolio.
The combination of the above factors has led to strong wealth positions for many
of these farms. Thus, if the farm transfer decision is delayed, the growing size of the
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estate to be transferred to the younger generation may come with a large tax obligation.
In such cases, it is not uncommon for the successor to sell a portion of farm assets (such
as a parcel of farmland) to meet the tax obligations and/or to compensate other off-farm
successor/s. Such disposition of assets reduces the size of the operation and may
negatively affect the firm’s production efficiency, future growth and continuity.
Existing literature and statistical evidence show that farm family businesses
experience life-cycle changes in farmer productivity and family consumption. This
research focuses on these factors since they impact the firm’s growth and ability to
accumulate wealth. Tauer (1995) studied the age-productivity relationship 3 of U.S.
farmers and concluded that farmer productivity increased about 7.5 percent as farmers
moved into successive age groups until they reached the 35-44 age group and then
declined at a similar rate.
Family living expenses is another expense category placed on the family farm
businesses, unless the earned income from off-farm sources 4 is available to cover some or
all of the family living expenses. The added withdrawals place additional requirements
on the annual cash flow of the farm business, reduce the retained earnings, and affect the
firm’s future growth and wealth accumulation. Thus, it is critical to recognize that there
are two families on the farm (the younger and older generations) overlap at different
stages of their life-cycles and change the composition of the household dependent on the
farm business to different degrees depending on their ownership positions.

3

Tauer (1995) specified six age groups (25 or younger, 25 to 34 years, 35 to 44 years, 45 to 54 years, 55 to
64 years, and over 65 years).
4
Off-farm income is specified as any income stream available for the farm household except the farm
equity. Wages earned on the farm may be included in the off-farm income.
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These two factors (family consumption needs and the age-productivity profile of
the owner-operators) affect the firm’s profits, growth potential, and the size of the
business at the time of transfer. The latter one determines the terminal wealth of two
families and tax obligation associated with the transfer of wealth to the younger
generation. Generally, more growth is desirable and needed to ensure a continuity in lifestyle for both families and to secure the wealth position of the farm business. However,
as the size of the farm increases greater amounts of wealth must be transferred to the
younger generation, exacerbating the tax burden and potentially reducing the wealth
position and future growth of the business. The trade-off between the firm’s growth and
the potential tax implications at the time of transfer directly affects terminal wealth and
the farm’s continuity.
The life-cycle patterns in farmer productivity and family consumption, and
changes in composition of household impact the growth potential of the business which,
in its turn, along with wealth transfer strategy determine the tax obligation at the end of
the planning horizon. The above factors ultimately impact the wealth accumulation
process and help determine (directly or indirectly) the terminal wealth position of the
business. If these factors are not considered properly the farm transfer is not likely to
result in the achievement of the maximum wealth position or in the greatest possible
chance of its continuity.
Oftentimes, producers focus on transfer tax minimization and/or specific transfer
tool when determining the most desirable time to initiate farm transfer (apart from other
non-financial considerations such as family dynamics, availability of successor, etc.). In
the presence of life-cycle patterns, their impact on the firm’s growth, and trade-offs
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between the firm’s growth potential and tax obligations are not integrated into the
decision-making process, the selected timing for the transfer initiation will likely result in
lower than maximum level of terminal wealth for the farm.
The problem is that delayed or early farm transfer initiation will not result in the
accumulation of the maximum possible level of terminal wealth in the business and thus
reduce the probability of the firm’s continuity and future financial viability into the next
generation.
1.1 Motivation
Continuity and financial viability of large and very large farms is crucial to
agricultural stability since these farms are estimated to produce 60 percent 5 of agricultural
production in the U. S. farm sector (USDA ERS2014). A transition crisis or large number
of failures would not only impact the economic and social well-being of the individuals
and their families but also the rural communities where they live.
Intergenerational farm transfer is a difficult endeavor. Faced with the complexity of
the issue, current owner-operators may not fully observe or realize how the timing of
farm transfer impacts their firm’s continuity, viability and terminal wealth position. A
better understanding of the relationships among the timing of transfer initiation and other
drivers of the firm’s growth such as life cycles in farmer productivity and consumption
will allow for a quantitative analysis of the implication of the delayed or early transfer of
the farm on the terminal wealth of the business.

5

This statistic refers to the farms of midsize and large-scale U.S. family farms.
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1.2 Contribution and Application
Available literature focuses primarily on such elements of intergenerational farm
transfer issues as succession planning (Mishra et al. 2010, Glauben et al. 2004, Harris et
al. 2012), the sector-level implications of the potential impact of a massive shift of
wealth, and the legal mechanisms/methods of intergenerational farm transfer measured in
financial terms (Boehlje and Eisgruber 1972, Peterson 2013). These studies provide
important insights on various aspects of this phenomenon; however, none of them
recognize or incorporate life-cycle patterns in family consumption, farmer productivity,
and changes in household composition as factors which impact the growth potential, tax
obligations, which ultimately determine the terminal wealth position of the business.
This study narrows down and incorporates the above mentioned factors building a
representation of the wealth creation process inherent in the family farm business. It is
hoped that the resulting deterministic simulation model will ultimately be modified into a
user-friendly decision tool to inform agricultural producers about the financial impact of
the timing of farm transfer initiation on their business. It is further hoped that this model
will continue to be developed and be used by others, including lending institutions and
wealth management firms to help their clients make sound choices in the timing of their
farms transition.
1.3 Objectives
The primary goal of this research is to develop and apply a deterministic
electronic simulation model that determines the potential financial consequences of early
or delayed farm transfer initiation on the wealth position of large and very large farm
businesses in the Midwest. This goal is achieved by fulfilling the following objectives:
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Build a representative electronic simulation model that reflects the wealth creation
process in large and very large family farm businesses in the Midwest (Nebraska,
South Dakota, and Iowa).



Impose life-cycle patterns in farmer productivity and family consumption to
reflect their impact on the growth potential of the business.



Based on the simulation results, identify the time of farm transfer initiation under
a certain transfer method (amount of annual gifts and final transfer tool) that
yields the highest level of terminal wealth accumulated by both generations
through the farming operation at the time of the parents’ passing (end of the
planning horizon) and increases the likelihood of business continuity.



Finally, conduct a series of sensitivity tests to determine the responsiveness of the
terminal wealth to the selected assumptions made in the construction of the
model.

1.4 Organization
Chapter 1 addresses the need (motivation) for this research, illustrates how this
work can potentially benefit various stakeholders (value or contribution) and outlines the
structure of this document to enhance readers understanding. Chapter 2, is an overview of
the existing literature providing background and relevance which helps the reader
understand various aspects of the intergenerational farm transfer and relevant concepts
from agricultural finance theory used in developing the analytical model.
Chapter 3 provides the description of the conceptual framework and empirical
model, lists and explains underlying assumptions, and defines scenarios used in the
sensitivity analysis. Data sources and the construction of the representative farm are
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explained in detail in Chapter 4. The discussion then moves to Chapter 5 in which the
simulated results for the baseline and other scenarios are presented and explained.
Finally, Chapter 6 highlights major conclusions, implications and discussion.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
2.1 Farmer Productivity: Life-Cycle Pattern
The relationship between individual productivity and age has traditionally been an
important research area in such fields as psychology and gerontology. In the last several
decades, the fields of labor economics and demographics have started investigating this
phenomenon recognizing that the U.S. labor force age profile has been shifting, i.e. baby
boomers (those born in the U.S. between 1946 and 1964) are approaching retirement age.
Initial work in the area of the age-performance did not find a strong direct impact of age
on work performance (Rhodes 1983, Davies and Sparrow 1985). Later work such as
Salthouse and Mauer (1996) studied the productivity variation over the life cycle using a
different perspective from previous works. Instead of evaluating the direct impact of age
on the productivity, they developed a framework in which the effect of age on the work
performance was mediated through other variables (e.g., abilities, skills, and worker
characteristics). They concluded that as the individual aged, his/her cognitive abilities
declined. In particular, around the age of 50 and after, individuals’ reasoning ability and
episodic memory declined. Other studies (Baltes and Linderberger 1997, Hoyer and
Lincourt 1998) found that individuals’ speed at which they learned and processed
information deteriorated with advancing age.
A more recent work in this area (Skirbekk 2004) shows that the individual
productivity can be described as an inverted U-shaped curve with a significant decline in
productivity around the age of 50. This study concluded that while people generally
experienced productivity variation over their life time, those changes depended on the
work tasks being performed. In situations that demand rapid problem-solving and
learning, individuals’ productivity declines rapidly with age. However, aging has a
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significantly lower impact on the individual’s productivity if the job requires extensive
experience and verbal communication (these abilities are much less affected than the
speed of learning and processing).
Tauer (1984, 1995) and Tauer and Lordkipanidze (2000) conducted a series of
research that estimated farmer productivity by age using several approaches. In the first
study (1984), separate farm-level gross revenue production functions were estimated for
each age group of farmers. Their results suggest that farmers of different ages use slightly
different technologies and use inputs with varying efficiencies. According to these results
farmer productivity peaks around the age 35-45 and is nearly 30 percent higher when
compared to the 25-year-old group.
The second study (Tauer 1995) estimated productivity by age for ten U.S.
production regions using state-level data. The underlying production technology was
assumed to be constant within the region and age groups, but farmers of varying ages
were assumed to utilize the same technology at different efficiency levels. Following
Diewert (1976), the Tornquist input index was applied in translog form of relative
efficiency of two different age groups, and two regression models were estimated (with
symmetric and nonsymmetric specifications). His results support the general direction of
changes in farmer productivity as age progresses: it generally increases and then
decreases with age. Results by production region generally indicate that productivity
changes 5 to 10 percent on average every 10 years and are symmetric in nature.
Productivity increases on average 5-10 percent every ten years until the middle age (35 45 years) and then declines at the same rate. This study finds that middle-aged farmers
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are 10 to 20 percent more productive (different from 30 percent estimated by Tauer 1984)
compared to younger and older age groups.
More recently non-parametric linear programming was used to obtain Malmquist
productivity indices for each farmer age group (Tauer and Lordkipanidze 2010). This
methodology allows for separation of the productivity index into two components
(efficiency and technology) which provides more complete insight into productivity
difference among farmers of varying age groups. The 1992 Census data was used to
estimate state-level productivity indices by four specified age groups. Generally, their
results suggest that productivity slightly increases with age and then declines. However, a
lot of variability is observed across states and regions.
The decomposition of the productivity index shows that the majority of the
variation comes from changes in technology use rather than changes in
efficiency. Among Midwestern states, productivity peaks earlier (around 25-34 years)
compared to other regions which is primarily driven by changes in technology use rather
than efficiency. Midwestern states exhibit very rapid increase in technology use at early
stages of life-cycle which levels off with time, while the efficiency remains almost
unchanged over age.
2.2 Household Consumption: Life-Cycle Pattern
Farm household consumption is one of many drivers of firm’s growth since it
impacts capital available for investment (e.g., ability to purchase productive assets) and
the firm’s growth potential (Pederson and Brake 1982, Phimister 1985).
Traditionally money income/wealth of the household is used as an indicator of the
economic well-being or standard of living for the household. But there are those that have
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argued that household consumption is a better measure of the household’s standard of
living (Johnson et al. 2005, Cutler et al. 1991, Meyer and Sullivan, 2003).
Jones et al. (2010) found that since 1998 farm households have had higher income
(3 to 20 percent) and wealth (4 times) compared to urban households; however, farm
households experienced more volatility in income compared to their urban counterparts.
The authors hypothesized that using the money income or wealth approach may result in
an inaccurate comparison. Thus, they adopted the consumption approach as a more stable
measure of long-term economic well-being of the household. When incomes are low,
farm households consume a relatively larger portion of their current income compared to
their urban counterparts. Conversely, when incomes are high, they do not expand
discretionary purchases to the extent that urban households do. Farm households have a
lower marginal propensity to consume (MPC) from current income and tend to smooth
out consumption over time.
Mishra et al. (2002) addressed the fact that farm households traditionally had
multiple sources of income and concluded that farm households were relatively better off
compared to the average U.S. household when other off farm sources were included.
Carriker et al. (1993) studied farm families’ consumption when current income
was drawn from multiple sources (from farm operation, off-farm work, and government
payments). Assuming that all three income sources are perfect substitutes, the propensity
to consume off-farm income and government payments was found to be higher than
propensity to consume income from farming operations. When a farm household draws
funds for its consumption from farm income only, its responses historically are dampened
or smoothed overtime.
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This low marginal propensity to consume is an indication of some habit
persistence or impact of past events on the current consumption pattern (Langemeier and
Patrick1990, Hall 1979). Four major theories have been used to explain habit persistence
of consumption: (1) partial adjustment hypothesis (Johnston 1984), (2) relative income
hypothesis (Duessenberry 1952, Mullen et al. 1980), (3) permanent income hypothesis
(Friedman 1957), and (4) life cycle hypothesis (Ando and Modigliani 1963). Langemeier
and Patrick (1990) used all four consumption theories to estimate MPC for a sample of
Illinois grain farms between 1979 and 1986 and conducted non-nested hypothesis tests to
explain farm consumption most accurately. Their results are consistent with those
mentioned above and suggest that farm households have low short-run MPCs ranging
between 0.007 and 0.020. During times of high income, farm household consumption
tends to increase slower than its income, indicating more income is available to be
reinvested back into the business. In contrast, when farm incomes are low, consumption
is adjusted (but not significantly) which requires withdrawal of additional funds from
stored up equity i.e. farm assets, deferred debt payments, delayed capital investments,
etc.) (Langemeier and Patrick 1990). This original finding is supported by more recent
works (Langemeier and Snider 2009, Browning and Crossley 2001). These findings
indicate that the assumption of constant consumption over time is not as unreasonable as
sometimes perceived by researchers. Thus, in this study (with 10 years planning horizon),
little or no change in short run consumption of farm households is anticipated.
However, the level of consumption is expected to vary with changes in the
composition of family and size of the operation. The USDA report on Income, Wealth
and the Economic Well-being of Farm Households indicates that a positive relationship is
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observed between the size of the farm business and the family living expenses of the
household (Mishra et al. 2002). Using the 1996 and 1998 Agricultural Resource
Management Study (ARMS) data it has been found, unlike with the income generating
ability, consumption tends to peak at the early stages of the family’s life cycle and
gradually levels off. The data’s highest average family living expenses, $35,635 per year
per household were observed for operators 35 years old or younger while the lowest
average annual living expenses were $10,079 per household for operators 65 years or
older.
Information from the University of Minnesota’s Farm Financial Management
Database shows that family living expenses generally vary by the size of operation and
peak when the head of the household is 41 to 50 years old.
In summary, the literature supports the idea that farm household consumption is
relatively constant in the short run but changes as these households move into the
succeeding age group and as the size of the farm operation changes.
2.3 Transfer Environment
Transfer Tax Policy
When transferring wealth to the younger generation during the older generation’s
lifetime (inter vivo transfers or bequests), tax implications associated with the transfer
process must be carefully considered by both generations to reduce the financial burden
of these obligations on the business. Tax implications depend on how the assets are
transferred to the younger generation (e.g., sale, installment sales, lifetime gifts, passed
through an estate). If assets are sold, the seller incurs the income tax placed on the
difference between the selling price and the adjusted basis of the asset (Hachfeld, Bau,
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Holcomb 2014). Installment sales allow the seller to spread the proceeds from the sale of
his/her assets and the resulting income tax obligations associated with the sale over time.
This study, however, focuses on lifetime gifting and the transfer of estate at death (via
will). The resulting tax implications as explained in detail below.
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) Code defines the federal estate tax
(sometimes referred to as “transfer tax”) as a tax placed on the individual’s right to
transfer his/her property to another individual(s) at the time of his/her death. A 40
percent tax rate is applied to taxable estates that exceed $5.45 million as of 2016. The
gross estate is the dollar amount of the decedent’s property to be transferred to the
successor calculated at the fair market value. Taking out appropriate deductions (e.g.,
marital deductions, debt, administrative and funeral expenses, and charitable deductions)
and adding back taxable lifetime gifts produces the taxable estate. The taxable estate is
reduced by the amount of available estate and lifetime gift exemption, $5.45 million, and
the residual value is taxed at a 40 percent tax rate (IRS 2016). The state estate tax has
been repealed and cancelled in most states over the last two decades. Currently, only 12
states6 and the District of Columbia still impose a state estate tax on the transfer of estates
with a 16 percent tax as the highest rate (Michael 2015).
Gift tax is defined as a tax on the property being transferred (directly or
indirectly) and without asking anything in return. Typically, a donor is responsible for the
gift tax; however, other arrangements can be made if both parties agree (IRS 2016). The
federal government identified certain types of gifts as non-taxable: (1) gifts that do not
exceed the annual gift tax exclusion amount ($14,000 as of 2016), (2) gifts to a spouse,

6

Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, the District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington.
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(3) covering another donee’s tuition or medical expenses, and (4) charitable gifts. The
donor can transfer a non-taxable gift to as many donees as he/she wishes without
incurring a gift tax (as long as the annual gift per individual per calendar year does not
exceed the annual gift exclusion amount, $14,000). If the gift exceeds the federal annual
tax-free gift amount, the dollar value of the excess is added back to the taxable estate at
the time of the final transfer to compute the federal estate tax. On the state level, the gift
tax is applied only in Connecticut (Michael 2015).
Currently, five states7 impose inheritance tax on property that is being transferred
as inheritance to the donee, with New Jersey and Maryland imposing both state estate and
inheritance taxes. The inheritance tax depends on the relationship of the heir (lineal or
collateral): in Iowa, inheritance tax is not applied to the lineal heirs (grandmother,
grandfather, parents and their children), while in Nebraska, the exemption amount for
lineal heirs is $40,000 and a 1 percent inheritance tax rate is applied on the excess if the
estate exceeds this exemption amount.
Succession Planning
About 70 percent of U.S. family businesses fail the transfer to the second
generation, and about 90 percent are not able to remain a successful financial viable
enterprise when transferred from the second to the third generation (Williams and
Preisser 2003). Some studies show that 60 percent of these failures are associated with
the communication breakdown in the family, 25 percent due to failure to prepare heirs, 12
percent are associated with other errors, and only 3 percent result from professional errors
in accounting, legal, or financial advising (Babikian 2006, Williams and Preisser 2003).

7

Iowa, Nebraska, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Tennessee.
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Kaplan et al. (2009) conducted interviews with farm families to better understand
the causes of communication breakdown during the farm transfer process. They
concluded that passive communication, the presence of unresolved issues between family
members, and the lack of inclusion of the younger generation into future planning were
major causes of unsuccessful dialogue in farm families, particularly when the
intergenerational farm transfer was discussed. These results suggest that succession
planning is a crucial aspect of the intergenerational farm transfer.
Harris et al. (2012) found that the presence of succession plan had a significant
positive effect on the farm’s on-going financial performance (profitability and return on
equity). In addition, farms with an identified successor showed stronger financial
performance compared to those without the successor.
Applying a binomial logit regression model to a farm-level dataset and treating
wealth as an endogenous variable, Mishra et al. (2010) studied the drivers/determinants
of succession planning in U.S. family farm businesses. Results show that the age of the
operator and the net worth of the farm business have a statistically significant positive
effect on the likelihood of having a succession plan.
Glauben et al. (2004) used survey data for 272 farm households in Germany to
study the impact of farm and family characteristics on the likelihood of farm succession
within a given observation period utilizing probit and competing risk models. Based on
the results, higher profitability, larger amounts of farmland owned in the operation and
larger size of households increase the probability of succession of the business to the
younger generation.
Estate Tools and Structure of Business Ownership
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Farm transition is a complex process and consists of three major components: (1)
the transfer of ownership of assets (or business entity itself), (2) the transfer of control
over assets, and (3) the decision on whether to allow other parties (non-successors who
do not have ownership and/or control) to participate in future revenue streams of the firm
(Ferrell and Jones 2013).
The most commonly used estate tools are wills, trusts, and life insurance. A
simple will is a very common estate tool used by farm businesses. A will is a legal
document that provides directions for redistribution of estate to heirs after the death of the
owner/s of the estate. (Ferrell and Jones 2013). Advantages of a will include the ability to
adjust a will prior to death and appoint the individual to administer probatewhich is
required for the will to have any binding legal effect. This probate procedure may be
costly, may take significant time, and is a public event, making information presented
their (the firm’s current financial position, future plans, inventories, etc.) open for
scrutiny or perusal by anyone.
Unlike a simple will, a trust is a separate legal entity that does not require assets
to go through probate to be allocated to their recipients. These features of this transfer
method ensure confidentiality of the farm business’s matters during the process and is
much more difficult to contest. Some of its disadvantages include the upfront costs of
establishing and managing a trust and its complete irrevocability after the owner’s death.
Life insurance is a rather flexible and useful estate tool that is not as widely used
by many farm families. Its main advantages are that; (1) It increases the size of estate to
support the economic well-being of heirs and/or remaining spouse without affecting the
taxable estate, (2) It covers funeral expenses and administrative costs, (3) It can be used
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to balance the allocation of transfers among on- and off-farm heirs (on-farm successor
would get all productive assets needed to maintain the farm business as a viable
enterprise, while life insurance proceeds would be given to the off-farm heirs, much like
a payoff), and (4) It may give an opportunity to a successor who wishes to buy out the
interest of the off-farm heirs by purchasing life insurance on their parents. The main
disadvantage/challenge is the upfront cost of the premiums.
While estate tools aid in transferring wealth after the death of the owner, there are
other components of the farm transition process (such as the choice of the structure of
business ownership and transactional tools) that take place during the life of the owner. If
carried out correctly, these factors can potentially make the transfer process of ownership,
control and participation smoother.
According to the 2012 Census of Agriculture, about 87 percent of farm operators
who are 60 or older listed sole proprietorship as a legal status of their operations, whereas
only 7 percent formed their business as a partnership registered under the state law and 5
percent as a corporation (USDA NASS2012). If carefully selected, the right choice of
business entity can help reduce tax obligations (particularly self-employment taxes),
facilitate a smoother transfer of assets between generation (transferring interest in
business or stock rather than a percent of a physical asset annually), and provide legal
protection (a limited liability used to protect assets as the business grows.
A sole-proprietorship is a business entity that is easy to form and manage, has the
lowest record-keeping requirements of any other entity in the U.S. and allows for only
one owner. Its main disadvantage, however, is the self-employment tax (15.3 percent as
of 2016) which places a significant financial burden on the business.
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Partnership businesses allow for multiple owners (partners) and a convenient
splitting of income and expenses among these individuals. Arranging the business in this
form may help limit liability protection for non-active partners but exposes general
partners to liabilities incurred by the others. Similar to the sole proprietorship,
partnerships are required to pay self-employment taxes.
A limited Liability Company (LLC) is a relatively new but popular type of
business entity that offers the same liability protection as corporations do for all members
(Ferrell and Jones 2013). Members are liable only up to the amount of their investment in
the business.
Corporations (S-Corp and C-Corp) provide benefits but have a more complex
structure and have specific criteria to start and maintain. Organizing the business as a
corporation provides self-employment tax savings and significant liability protection for
the owners, offers some potential income tax savings (C-corporation), and allows for
smooth transfer of ownership of the farm business (e.g., transferring shares of the
business). Corporation do have some drawbacks as well such as; 1) C type corporations
have double taxation on the retained earnings, 2) Type S corporations incur tax liabilities
at the time of dissolution.
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CHAPTER 3: MODEL
3.1 Conceptual Framework
The family farm businesses are most likely to be viable post transfer when wealth
is maximized, ceteris paribus. Thus, for purposes of the study a wealth accumulation
model was created to focus on only those firms that wanted the continuity of the family
farm business as a joint goal of both generations engaged in the business. The model will
allow for studying the impact of the timing of farm transfer initiation on the terminal
wealth in the business.
Planning Horizon
The model uses a time horizon of 10 years (N) which starts at n=1 and ends upon
the execution of the will in the last period where N=10 with each year’s ending wealth
discounted to the present value. For this analysis, the will is executed upon the demise of
both parents8 which is set to be the end of period 10.
Boehlje and Eisgruber (1971) considered time and uncertainty explicitly when they
modeled farm estate management plans. They used a survival function to calculate
mortality probabilities and applied them in the simulation of this multi-stage decision
problem. Their goal was to identify the set of estate creation and transfer strategies as new
information about the survivability of the older generation became available.
While the uncertain nature of the older generation’s life expectancy is important in
the overall picture in the transition process, they are beyond the scope of this work and are
left to others.

8

The death of the first parent can also trigger the final transfer of his/her portion of wealth to the younger
generation if the selected final transfer instrument allows for such transfer. However, in this model, we
assume that the wealth is transferred to the surviving spouse upon to the death of the first parent and then
the final transfer occurs when the second parent passes away (life estate).
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A 10 year planning horizon was used due to the model’s need for the specification
of economic conditions. Most advance firm-level baseline projection models developed
and maintained by USDA Economic Research Service (ERS), Food and Agricultural
Policy Research Institute (FAPRI), and Texas A&M University (the Firm Level Income
Policy Simulation Model (FLIPSIM)) make forecasts only for 10 years into the future.
Thus, extending the planning horizon beyond 10 years would create concerns related to
reliability and scenario development. Since the value of farmland is the largest single driver
in wealth accumulation forecasting its value even for 10 years might be considered tenuis.
During the period of the simulation, 10 years, it is assumed that the older generation
has made a life estate contract with the younger generation. As the 10 year period reaches
its end, the surviving spouses passes away and the final transfer to the younger generation
is completed9. In year one, the model is populated with key input variables (KIVs)
calculated based on the firm’s financial performance at the beginning of the planning
horizon. Then, using financial relationships, equations, and the populated data, the model
generates the firm’s growth for the next nine years.
Transition Strategies: Proactive versus Regular
The intergenerational farm transfer process includes both estate planning and
transition planning. The estate plan allows for the successful transfer of the physical assets
and the transition plan helps ensure the continued operation of the farm business. The
transition planning encompasses three major areas: succession planning, retirement
planning, and the firm’s financial viability assessment and projections. All three contribute
to the future continuity of the business. In succession planning, both generations decide

9

The assumption on the death of the last parent (end of year 10) has not been tested in this study. Thus, the
model was run only for 10 years. The testing of this assumption is left for future research.
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and agree on how managerial responsibilities will be transferred to the next generation.
The retirement component of the transition plan helps procure sources of retirement income
for the older generation to ensure their consumption needs are met. The financial viability
assessment of the farm allows for an objective evaluation of the financial condition and
performance of the business. This information is used to judge the firm’s ability to support
consumption of both generations.
The intergenerational transfer of the farm business is generally not a discrete event,
but a continuous process and defines the transfer initiation time. The intergenerational
transfer process is the period of time when both generations develop and are executing both
transition and estate strategies. This work is limited to two types of transition strategies,
proactive and regular. The Proactive transition strategy refers to the situation in which
both generations have developed and started implementing components of the transition
planning prior to the transfer initiation. The proactive transition strategy is the situation
where the younger generation has been given managerial responsibilities 10 and is able to
withdraw their share of the income generated by the business11 prior to the initiation of the
transfer. This would be the case where the operation has a seasoned primary operator and
a well-established and groomed successor who has been actively involved in the farming
operation. The regular transition strategy has no components of transition planning
implemented until the transfer is initiated. This is where the younger generation does not
hold any managerial responsibilities in the business and does not have access to farm

10
11

proportional to its ownership share in the farm business
to cover consumption withdrawals
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income12 , other than their wage. If equity is being built up, it is automatically re-invested
into the business.
Terminal Wealth
Terminal wealth is defined as the wealth position13 of the business after the farm
transfer process is completed. The transfer process is assumed to be completed when the
transfer tool selected by the older generation is enacted (e.g., the will is executed), the
remaining part of the wealth (total older generation’s wealth minus gifts already
transferred) is transferred to the younger generation according to the parameters of the
final transfer tool specifications, and the tax obligations associated with the transfer are
taken out.
Conceptually, this study adopts a traditional definition of wealth (the composition
and sources are contained in equation 1). This equation is used to recreate the process of
wealth generation and accumulation in a farm business. Terminal wealth consists of the
sum of the following arguments: total amount of initial wealth in the business, discounted
retained earnings accumulated by both generations during the planning horizon, discounted
capital gains/losses on assets owned, i.e. farmland, and discounted tax obligations
associated with the transfer of wealth.
=
where,
= 1,

12
13

+∑

(

)

+

(

)

−

(

(1)

)

is the terminal wealth in present terms of the business in the 10 th period;
, planning horizon;

, the initial wealth;

, retained earnings generated in

The term “farm income” is interchangeable used with the term “firm’s profit”.
Wealth position in this study refers to the dollar value of the owner equity in the business.
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period ; , the discount rate;

, capital gains/losses realized in the terminal period and

, federal estate tax.
Another modelling approach would be to include the off farm income. This
means decisions and choices are made based on the wealth position of the farm
household rather than just the farm business. (Mishra et al.2002). For instance, during the
1980’s crisis, off-farm income often served as a major income stream which improved
farm businesses’ resilience to risks.
Blank and Erickson (2009) found that farmland outperformed the non-farm
investments in the last decade and hypothesized that farm households may turn to offfarm income to keep their farmland and build wealth. These facts suggest that farm
production, investment, and financing decisions might include both off and on farm
wealth rather than just those associated with the farm. In this case, terminal wealth would
be defined as:
=
where,

+

(1 + )

+

(1 + )

+

(1 + )

−

(1 + )

(2)

, off-farm income streams generated by both generations earned in year n are

added into the equation. This value captures any off-farm wages/salaries earned by the
older and younger generations, as well as income collected due to off-farm investments
during the planning horizon. This approach allows for the incorporation of off-farm
wages/salaries and is used in this work.
USDA estimates that off-farm employment and investments depend on the size of
the farm business. For large and very large family farms, the primary operators claim
farming as their occupation and rely solely on the income from the farm business.
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Smaller farms tend to have the off-farm employment as their main income stream and are
more likely to invest in off-farm sources. For large and very large farms addressed in this
study, the off-farm income is expected to be an additional source of income 14 used to
cover consumption withdrawals only and not subsidize the firm’s growth. Therefore, the
model as specified in Equation 1 is used to study the impact of the transfer time under
assumptions on the gifting strategy and final transfer tool for family farm businesses that
aim the business continuity by maximizing the terminal wealth.
Retained Earnings
The retained earnings of the business are defined as the after-tax profit less
household living expenses, plus off-farm income (a substitute for covering family living
expenses) is shown in Equation 3.
RE = (1 − τ)π − (C − OffInc )

(3)

where,

=

−

(4)

(1 − )

is after-tax income (further referred as net income) in period ; is income

tax rate;

is household consumption withdrawals in period ;

is off-farm

income streams generated by both generations earned in year n that can serve as a
supplement for covering family living withdrawals;
∑

is gross revenue in period n;

is total production cost (operating, interest, and depreciation expenses) used in

period n, with inputs denoted i through K, where K is the total number of inputs used.
Age-Productivity Profile

14

Any sources of income but farm equity withdrawals.
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Since farmer productivity is expected to change with age, gross revenue generated
in the business is adjusted by the factor

to capture the impact of the age-productivity

profile of both generations of operators. In this model, the transfer of the ownership of the
farm is concurrent and proportional with the transfer of the managerial responsibilities.
Thus, the joint farmer productivity index, as specified in Equation 5, is the sum of the
respective age-dependent productivity indices for the older and younger operators
weighted by their respective shares of ownership in the business that reflect the degree of
managerial involvement in the business in a given period.
γ

=α γ +α γ
where,

(5)

, ownerships share of the older generation in the business in period t;

ownerships share of the younger generation in the business in period t;
productivity of the older generation in period t;

,

, the base

, the base productivity of the younger

generation in period t. The base indices are drawn from Tauer and Lordkipanidze (2000)
and are age- and state-specific.
Annual Consumption and Consumption Withdrawals under the Baseline Scenario
This section explains the methodology and construction for approximating the level
of annual consumption for each generation and total annual withdrawals from the farm
business in the baseline scenario. Under other scenarios used in this study, the logic and
assumptions about consumption withdrawals remain unchanged but the level of the
younger generation’s consumption covered by farm operations varies (see Chapter 4).
Consumption for each generation is approximated by the average farm family living
expenses using state-level data (see Chapter 4 for details). Two criteria are used to generate
the level of annual consumption for each generation: 1) the age of the head of a family unit,
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which is a proxy for the size and composition of the family, and 2) the size of the farm
business15. For example, the younger generation’s level of annual consumption in year 1
of the planning horizon is populated from the Lookup table 2 provided in Appendix D
based on the successor’s age 16 and his/her portion of the farm business controlled for that
year. In the second year, this value is updated due to an increase in the successor’s age and
any changes in farm business control. This methodology is intended to approximate typical
farm family consumption at varying stages of its life-cycle and changing ownership
structure of the farming operation. Consumption is estimated in like manner for all
consecutive years.
The total consumption withdrawals depend on the transition strategy that the
business follows. In the instance of the proactive transition strategy total consumption
withdrawals are constructed as follows:
1. Prior to the farm transfer initiation, the farm fully covers the older generation’s annual
consumption, and the younger generation is allowed to take out equity from the
business to cover their annual consumption, but only up to their share of generated
income in the business in a given year. Total consumption withdrawals are the sum of
the older generation’s annual consumption (full amount) and the smaller of the two –
the younger generation’s annual consumption or their share of income generated during
the year by the firm.

15

Total crop acres owned by the respective generation are used as a proxy for the size of the farm business
to approximate family living expenses and compute household consumption.
16
Successor is assumed to be the head of the younger generation’s family unit.
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2. Once the transfer is initiated, the farm business fully covers consumption of both
households, making total consumption withdrawals the sum of annual consumption of
both generations.
In the case of a regular transition strategy, total consumption withdrawals are
constructed as follows:
1. Prior to the farm transfer initiation, only the older generation’s consumption is covered
by the farm business. Total consumption withdrawals consist only of the older
generation’s annual consumption. The younger generation is not allowed to withdraw
farm equity to cover family consumption.
2. After the transfer is initiated, the farm business fully covers consumption of both
generations.
Off-Farm Income
Farm households make consumption decisions based on their total farm household
income17 rather than solely on income generated by the farm business. The USDA ERS
indicate that about 65.1 percent of farm household income comes from off-farm sources 18.
When farm household income consists of only income from the farm business, it places
the complete financial burden on the farm business. However, when off-farm income is
present, it has the opposite effect and reduces the financial burdens on the farm business.
In the baseline scenario, no off-farm income is available. However, this assumption is
relaxed in Scenario 1 and the earned off-farm income is incorporated as a factor that
reduces consumption withdrawals. When off-farm income is lower than the consumption,

17

Farm household income includes: (1) income from the farm business, (2) income from other farming
activities, and (3) earned and unearned income from off-farm sources. (USDA National Agricultural
Library. 2015. Glossary).
18
USDA ERS. 2016. Income and Wealth in Context, by Daniel Prager.
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the difference between the two is the amount that will be taken out from the farm income.
If the earned off-farm income fully covers the family consumption, the last term in the
equation is assumed to be zero.
From Equation 3, the term (

− OffInc ) > 0 implies that consumption exceeds the

earned income from off-farm sources in the current period. In this case, the remaining part
of the household consumption expenses are covered from the farm income and thus are
subtracted from the after-tax farm income. If the total wages and salaries in the current
period are large enough to fully cover the consumption expenses, then (

− OffInc ) <

0. Since the model of the accumulated wealth in this study does not attempt to incorporate
the effect of the contributed capital from other non-farm sources to grow the primary
farming business, the last term on the right-hand side of Equation 3 is set to zero. In this
case, the earned off-farm income fully covers the household consumption expenditures and
no funds are withdrawn or added to the farm income.
Capital Gains/Losses in Terminal Period N
Capital gains/losses are traditionally realized at the time of transfer or a sale of
property. An alternative framework suggested by Plaxico and Kletke (1979) and Boehlje
and Lowenberg-DeBore (1986) is to model capital gains and losses in which a
fraction( ) of unrealized gain/loss in each period were recognized as an income stream
by the lending institution, and the remaining fraction,(1 − ) occurs at the time of final
transfer of wealth (period N). Allowing the fraction of capital gains to be realized before
the final transfer and be recognized as an income stream by the lending community
provides a basis for the firm to borrow against the appreciated farmland values.
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This model incorporates year-to-year changes in farmland prices to reflect their
impact on the firm’s Balance Sheet (value of farmland and owner equity position)
annually within the planning horizon and thus, financial performance in future periods.
However, this adjustment does not allow for borrowing against appreciated/depreciated
values of farmland. Adjustments in farmland prices enter into the simulation through the
variable
=

(

where

and calculated for each period as Equation 6.
−

(

)
)

(6)

is the annual percent change in farmland prices;

, dollar value of land

owned by the farm business in period n.
Wealth Transfer Methods
Wealth was shifted using two mechanisms: (1) lifetime gifting and (2) and a
simple will. The older generation uses lifetime gifting to shift wealth upon transfer
initiation (starting in period

∗

) and continues gifting away a constant amount of wealth

every year until their demise. The residual wealth owned by the older generation is
transferred to the younger generation through a will upon the older generation’s passing
in the terminal period N.
Gifting strategy
The gifting strategy comes into effect in period

∗

where * is the year number of

the planning horizon when the farm transfer initiation is begun. The baseline scenario
denotes annual gifting as

and assumes the legal annual maximum amount of gifting

without a tax penalty. This gifting strategy shifts wealth from one generation to another but
does not change the total wealth created and accumulated by the farm business (see
Equation 7).
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(1 + )

−
∗

(7)

(1 + )

Gifting results in three primary outcomes: 1) it has no direct impact on the total
wealth in the business, 2) it alters the size of the estate to be transferred and 3) it changes
the portion of ownership and control by both generations. It is the last effect of gifting
that will have an impact on the productivity index through the assumption that the
transfer of managerial responsibilities is proportional to changes in the ownership
structure.
Federal Transfer Tax
Final wealth transfer occurs at the time of the execution of the final transfer tool
in period n= 10 (in this study, a will). The tax base is based on the total wealth to be
transferred (value of all real and financial assets owned by the older generation) less
deductions (debt, funeral expenses, administrative costs associated with transfer) less
total amount of gifts already transferred.
(1 + )

= (

)

(8)

where,
=

(1 + )

+

(1 + )

−

−
∗

(1 + )

(9)

federal transfer tax obligations due in the final period, N; is a federal estate (transfer)
tax rate.
Discount Factor
The discount factor reflects the owner’s expectations of risk involved in operating
the farm business now and in future periods, interest rates, and time preferences. Time
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preferences and risk attitudes depend on the owner’s expectations about future events
which result from the owner’s preferences (utility function). If profits exhibit constant
growth over time, the capitalization rate can be used to compute the terminal value. One
way to specify the capitalization rate is to define it as a linear function of the variance of
profit expectations (

( )), yield on riskless securities ( ), and operator’s

substitutability between risk and profit, based on the shape of his utility function( )
(Vickers, 1968). Thus, capitalization rate can be expressed as:
=

+

( )

(10)

However, in the cases when projected income streams do not grow at a constant
rate, future streams of wealth are discounted using the time discount factor rather than the
capitalization rate. The weighted average cost of capital (WACC) is used as a discount
rate since it incorporates (1) time preferences, (2) inflation, and (3) risk.
3.2 Empirical Model
Model Description
Given the stated research question, an electronic simulation model was created to
predict the implications of the timing of the farm transfer initiation and gifting strategies
under varying exogenous shocks such as changes in farmland values and interest rates. In
thus study, the term simulation is not used in a statistical sense of generating data, but refers
to the methodology that uses a set of input variables and a system of equations to replicate
the process of wealth creation and accumulation in the farm business.
At the core of this simulation is a set of dynamic financial statements of a
representative farm linked through time for 10 years. The linking replicates the process of
wealth creation and accumulation across the planning horizon. Each financial statement is
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constructed using a number of relevant financial equations and linked over time as detailed
in this section. This methodology provides answers about how the time of the farm transfer
initiation affects the terminal wealth of the simulated business by:
(1) capturing the financial linkages among major determinants of the wealth creation and
the accumulation process of the business,
(2) accounting for certain phenomena that affect revenue generating and saving ability of
the business i.e. the age-productivity profile and the composition and level of household
consumption withdrawals through time,
(3) reflecting the impact of the decision variable(s) on the terminal wealth.
The ability of the model to account for these phenomena helps reflect the revenue
generation and growth potential of the business more accurately as the business undergoes
an intergenerational farm transfer. The model is constructed in a way that explicitly links
the decision variables of interest and the wealth creation process. For instance, one of the
decision variables is gifting strategy, in particular the level of wealth gifted annually. The
model reflects the impact of this strategy on (1) wealth transfer tax at the end of the
planning horizon and (2) change in ownership structure in the business between the older
and younger generations which in its turn determines how the managerial responsibilities
are transferred to the younger generations and how that transfer than affects the efficiency
and (productivity) revenue generation in the business.
The Operational Procedures for Using the Model
In the initial period, KIVs (key input variables) from representative farm are used
to populate the financial documents in the model’s year 1, and then given the base
assumptions/parameters the model simulates future periods’ financial statements
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documents in a recursive manner. The KIVs and parameters are listed in the section
below, and their specific numerical values are provided and discussed in Chapter 5. To
determine the maximum terminal wealth, the model is re-run ten times reflecting each of
the possible years in which the farm transfer could be initiated 19. For example, the first of
the ten runs is done assuming the transfer is initiated in year 1of the planning horizon,
and the key output variable (KOV), terminal wealth in the business, is generated and
recorded. This same procedure for each of the eight remaining possible transfer initiation
years (including year 9) is repeated, and respective terminal wealth positions are saved.
The last time the model is re-run assuming that the transfer has not yet been initiated, and
thus the total wealth is transferred upon the death of the older generation. The recorded
results allow for constructing a distribution of terminal wealth positions depending on the
transfer initiation year (1 through 9 and no transfer initiation) which visually captures the
effect of the transfer initiation on the terminal wealth position in the business.
Decision Variables
The planning of farm transfer from the older to the younger generation involves
many decisions in regard to asset ownership, managerial responsibilities, and
communication within and between the business and family members then this simplified
version. This study incorporates three decision variables: timing of farm transfer initiation,
level of annual gifts, and the instrument to transfer the remaining wealth. These variables
were chosen because they affect the terminal wealth and their impact can be identified and
quantified.

19

Please see Figures 1A and 1B in Chapter 5.
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The timing of farm transfer initiation is indeed a “trigger decision variable” since
it activates the decision on the final transfer method and the annual gifting strategy which
in turn calls for adjustments in the age-productivity profile and household consumption
withdrawals which then determine retained earnings and growth potential of the operation
in future periods.
Annual gifting is a tool designed to reduce the amount of wealth to be transferred
at the time of final transfer and to shift managerial responsibilities to the younger
generation. In this model annual gifting affects the distribution of wealth between the older
and younger generations in the business in each period affecting total farm productivity in
the business after this strategy is triggered, but does not directly change the total wealth.
Two types of gifting strategies are modelled: (1) normal, tax free annual gifting amount
($14,000 per year per individual) and (2) aggressive ($25,000 per year per individual).
The third decision variable, the will, is used to transfer the remaining wealth at the
time of the farm transfer initiation, but its impact is captured at the end of the planning
horizon. In this case a regular will is used as the final transfer tool. Each of the decisions
variables have implications on the potential tax obligation and affect the terminal wealth
position of the business.
Description of Financial Flows in the Wealth Creation Model
A visual representation of financial flows (as shown in Appendix A, Figures 1 and
2) provide theoretical background/rational for the specification of each financial document
and construction of linkages between these documents within a production year and over
the planning horizon.
As shown in Figure 1 of Appendix A, each period starts with the beginning year
Balance Sheet. The black arrows show the flow of wealth creation, while the yellow ones
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reflect the impact of farmer age on that process. The ending year Balance Sheet becomes
the beginning Balance Sheet of the next period. The asset base is used to generate gross
revenue recorded on the Income Statement. This is the first step in the wealth creation
process and the origin of the flow.
The liability category on the Balance Sheet, respective financial ratios, and the
level of output determine the operating and financing expenses with KIVs drawn from a
representative farm. Then, the revenues, all expenses and taxes are added, and net income
is obtained. Therefore, the assets owned by the business affect the firm’s production
capacity (output), and its liabilities partially determine the operating and financing
expenses. These linkages show both assets and liabilities at the beginning of the period
affect the after-tax net income in the business and reflect the flow from the Balance Sheet
to the Income Statement.
With no contributed capital added into the business during the planning horizon,
the statement of owner equity separates total equity into two major categories: (1) change
in valuation equity, and (2) change in retained earnings. By definition, retained earnings
are a portion of generated income left after all expenses are paid and necessary
withdrawals are taken from the business. Retained earnings are fully re-invested into the
business in each period after all financial obligations are met.
Retained earnings for each period are equal to net (after-tax) income minus total
consumption withdrawals for the period. If either of these two variables fluctuate,
retained earnings changes accordingly, altering the amount of reinvestment. Following
the above assumption, the retained earnings are reinvested back into the business
increasing the assets and the owner equity at the end of the current period. The firm’s
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current capital structure and cash flow control the degree to which the firm may
undertake additional debt if needed, which may alter total amount of assets and liabilities.
The ownership structure is tracked as ending equity on the statement of owner equity.
The ending equity is then recorded as the beginning equity in the balance sheet in the
succeeding year. This balance sheet then becomes the beginning of next period’s balance
sheet, and the flow continues through all periods.
The age of a farmer affects his/her productivity and thus the firm’s ability to
generate revenue and income. As represented with yellow lines, the farmer age also
determines the household consumption withdrawals affecting the retained equity and
firm’s growth potential in the future.
In Appendix A, Figure 2, decision variables and phenomena through which they
affect the wealth creation process are added on to the model presented in Figure 1 in the
same appendix. The model shown in Figure 2 has identical financial flows as in Figure 1,
but the flow is not visually presented on the graph to avoid additional complexity.
The yellow triangle symbolizes a set of decisions with arrows pointing to the
phenomena through which these decisions impact the financial flow in the model. The level
of annual gifting changes the ownership structure, determining the distribution of
ownership between two generations and thus impacting transfer tax obligations at the time
of final transfer. Their age determines family living expenses for each generation’s family
unit affecting the equity withdrawals from the business and thus its future growth.
In addition, the timing and speed of the changes in ownership structure and the
farmer’s age at the time when the transfer was initiated, determines the farmer ageproductivity profile affecting his/her ability to generate revenue. The last decision variable
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– the final transfer instrument – affects the model only in the terminal period. The type of
instrument selected may result in different tax implications for the business. Therefore,
decision variables impact the wealth creation flow in the model by adjusting (1) the ageproductivity parameter on the gross revenue function, (2) composition and level of
household consumption, and (3) the ownership structure in the business.
Specification of Financial Documents
The framework and guidelines of the Farm Financial Standards Counsel are
adopted in developing the financial documents that make up the model. However, the level
of detail included in these documents is minimal and is adjusted to the needs of this work.
The objective of this study requires computation to be done on a fairly aggregated level
relying on the accounting/financial relationships rather than production practices. A set of
financial efficiency ratios is adopted to reflect the efficiencies of the farm of a specific size.
This generalization enables focusing on the business and estate creation and transfer
process and avoiding unjustifiable complexity without undermining the correct logic and
financial relationships in the model.
The beginning year Balance Sheet provides a snapshot of the firm’s assets,
liabilities, owner equity and their respective composition at that date. As a stock document,
the Balance Sheet is created twice in a period: at the beginning and end of the year to reflect
the changes in the position over time. The ending year Balance Sheet becomes the
beginning year Balance Sheet in the following period. The production, financing, growth,
and management decisions made during the year as well as changes in farmland prices
affect the level and/or composition of assets, debt and equity in the business over that
period.
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As shown in Table 3.1, the Balance Sheet lists three major categories: assets,
liabilities, and equity. Asset and liabilities entries are classified into two subcategories to
reflect their structure: (1) current and (2) non-current. The non-current assets include (1)
farmland and (2) other non-current assets. The equity entry lists total owner equity in the
business and the ownership shares of the younger and older generations. This provides a
way to track the wealth owned by the older generation at the end of the planning horizon
yet to be transferred to the younger generation.
Table 3.1 Balance Sheet as Modelled in this Study for the Representative Farm

Current assets
Fixed assets
 Farmland
TOTAL ASSETS

Representative Farm
Balance Sheet
January 1, Year 1
Current liabilities
Non-current liabilities
TOTAL LIABILITIES
Equity
 Retained earnings
 Valuation equity
TOTAL OWNER EQUITY
 Owned by older generation
 Owned by younger generation

The entries on the Balance Sheet were constructed using the following set of equations:
,

=

,
,

∗
, total assets in business at the beginning of year 1, populated from the

representative farm data.
,

, current assets at the beginning of year 1.

, current assets as percent of total assets. This parameter is constant over the
whole planning horizon.
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=

,

=

,

, fixed assets in business at the beginning of year 1.

,
,

−

,

∗

,

, total dollar value of farmland in the business at the beginning of year 1.

,

, land as percent of fixed assets. This parameter remains constant throughout the
planning horizon.
=

,

∗

.

, total liabilities of the business at the beginning of year.

,

, debt-to-asset ratio of the firm. Capital structure is allowed to vary from year to
year, but the share of debt is capped at 25 percent.
=

,
,

∗

,

, current liabilities at the beginning of year 1.
, current liabilities as percent of total liabilities.
,

=
,

,

=

,

,

, non-current liabilities at the beginning on year 1.

−

,
,

,

−

,

,

, total owner equity at the beginning of year 1.

=

∗

,

,

,

, equity owned by the older generation at the beginning of year 1.

,

, ownership share of the older generation at the beginning of year 1.

=
,

,

∗

,

, equity owned by the younger generation at the beginning of year 1.
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,

, ownership share of the younger generation at the beginning of year 1.

The Income Statement is a flow document that reflects the income generating ability
of the business by accounting for the gross revenue, total operating and financing expenses,
as well as income tax obligations of the business. This document provides important
information further used to compute the retained earnings and changes in the size of the
asset base in future periods utilizing the Statement of Owner Equity and the Balance Sheet.
Table 3.2 shows the Income Statement as used constructed in the model. The
structure of the document follows a traditional form with the exception of three
adjustments.
Table 3.2 Income Statement as Modelled in this Study for the Representative Farm
Income Statement
Representative Farm
January 1 – December 31, Year 1
Gross revenue
Operating expense
Financing expense
Depreciation expense
Income before tax, total
 Income before tax, older generation
 Income before tax, older generation
Total taxes (income and self-employment)
 Older generation
- federal income tax
- state income tax
- self-employment tax
 Younger generation
- federal income tax
- state income tax
- self-employment tax
Net after-tax income, total
First, before-tax income in the firm is separated into two categories (the older and
the younger generation’s shares of income). Second, income and self-employment taxes
are calculated for each generation’s share of business separately. These two adjustments
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capture the impact of income sharing between two generations on total tax obligations.
Finally, the gross revenue is adjusted for the joint farmer productivity index to reflect the
life-cycle pattern.
Entries of the Income Statement are calculated with the set of equations described
below that utilize certain entries from the Balance Sheet (total assets), respective calculated
ratios (ATR, OER, IER, DER) and parameters on taxes and farmer productivity.
The Income Statement is constructed using the following equations:
=

∗

,

∗

=
, gross revenue generated in business in year 1.
, asset turnover ratio.
=

,

=0
,

∗

+

,

∗

,

ℎ

, joint farmer productivity in the business in year 1.
, base productivity index of the older farmer in year 1.
, base productivity index of the younger farmer in year 1.
, ownership share of the older generation at the beginning of year 1.

,

, ownership share of the younger generation at the beginning of year 1.

,

=
=
=

∗
∗
∗
, operating expenses of the firm in year 1.
, financing expenses of the firm in year 1.
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, depreciation expense of the firm in year 1.
OER, operating expense ratio, constant during the planning horizon.
IER, interest expense ratio, constant during the planning horizon.
, depreciation expense ratio, constant during the planning horizon.
=

−

−

−

, total before-tax income generated in business by both generations in year 1.
=

∗

,

, share of income generated by the older generation in year 1.
=

∗

,

, share of income generated by the younger generation in year 1.
=

∗

,

, federal income tax obligations of the older generation in year 1.
, federal income tax rate for the older generation in year 1.

,

=

∗

,

, federal income tax obligations of the younger generation in year 1.
, federal income tax rate for the younger generation in year 1.

,

=

∗

,

, state income tax obligations of the older generation in year 1.
, state income tax rate for the older generation in year 1.

,

=

,

∗
, state income tax obligations of the younger generation in year 1.

,

, state income tax rate for the younger generation in year 1.
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=

(0.124 + 0.029) ∗
,
0.124 ∗ 118,500 + 0.029 ∗

< $118,500
, ℎ

, Self-Employment tax obligations of the older generation in year 1.
0.124, Social Security tax of 12.4%
0.029, Medicare tax of 2.9%
$118,500, benchmark level of net income for self-employment tax calculations
(IRS Employer’s Tax Guide 2016).
=

+

=

−

+
=

−
+

+

+

, net (after-tax) income in the firm, total in year 1.
, total tax obligations (federal and state income, as well as social security
taxes) of the older generation for year 1.
, total tax obligations (federal and state income, as well as social security
taxes) of the younger generation for year 1.
Statement of Owner’s Equity tracks the changes in the owner equity from the
beginning to the end of the period. Certain entries from the Income Statement (net farm
income) and the Balance Sheet (farmland owned in the business) along with the
information on the changes of farmland prices allow for decomposition of the total owner
equity into its major sources (retained earnings and valuation equity) providing a more
accurate description of sources of equity growth. Total consumption withdrawals are
calculated as a sum of consumption withdrawals for both generations in a given year
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following the conceptual framework addressed in the beginning of this chapter and
specified baseline assumptions.
Table 3.3 Income Statement as Modelled in this Study for the Representative Farm
Statement of Owner’s Equity
Representative Farm
January 1 – December 31, Year 1
Beginning equity
Retained earnings
 Net farm income from operations
 Total consumption withdrawals
Valuation equity
Ending equity
 Owned by the older generation
 Owned by the younger generation
As shown in Table 3.3, in this analysis, a traditional format of this financial
document is constructed, except the ending equity entry. Given the goal of the study, this
variable is reported in the Statement of Owner’s Equity in two ways: (1) as total equity in
the business and (2) equity owned by each generation (after gifts are re-distributed, if any).
The entries on the above provided Income Statement were constructed/populated
using the following set of equations:
=

,

A, average amortization for non-current debt, assumed to remain constant during
the planning horizon.
, average principal payment for the representative farm.

=

,

, non-current liabilities in the firm at the beginning of year 1.

,

∗

, principal payment on non-current debt in year 1.
=

−

−
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, total retained earnings generated in the business by both generations in
year 1.
, total consumption withdrawals from the farm business in year 1.
=

+
, consumption withdrawals from the business to cover the older

generation’s family living expenses in year 1.
, consumption withdrawals from the business to cover the younger
generation’s family living expenses in year 1.
=
= (

,

), Lookup table is used to select the value based on

two main factors that determine family living expenses in FINBIN database (age of
operator and size of his/her share of operation).
=

,

∗

,

, family living expenses of the older generation in year 1.
, age of the head of the older generation’s household in year 1.
, the size of operation owned by the older generation in year 1 (in acres).

0,
=

=0
>0

,
(

∗

,

)

20

,

,

>0
>0

, family living expenses of the younger generation in year 1.

20

Whichever is lower.
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= (

,

), LOOKUP table is used to select the

value based on two main factors that determine family living expenses in FINBIN
database (age of operator and size of his/her share of operation).
,

=

∗

,

, age of the head of the younger generation’s household in year 1.
, acres owned by the younger generation in year 1.
=

−

∗(

,

)

0, ( − ) = 0
= > 0, ( − ) > 0
< 0, ( − ) < 0
, valuation equity in the firm in year 1.
(

,

,

=

,

=

), percent change in farmland prices between year 1 and 0.
+

,

−

,

=

−

,

+

,

To verify the above equation,
,

=

+

,

,

+

,

, total liabilities at the end of year 1 (before additional borrowing).

,

, total assets at the end of year 1 (before additional borrowing).

, total equity in business at the end of year 1.

, total amount of the firm’s equity gifted in year 1 by the older generation to the
younger one.
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=

,

∗

,

, where

,

,

,

= (

,

∗

,

=0

−

,

)

,

=

,

∗

,

= (

ℎ

, where

,

,

,
,

,

∗

,

+

,

,

=0
)

,

ℎ

, share of equity in business owned by the older generation at the end of year

,

1, after annual gifts are distributed (if any).
, share of equity in business owned by the younger generation at the end

,

of year 1, after annual gifts are distributed (if any).
=

,

∗(

=

,

,

1
)
( + )−

( )∗

,

−

,

(1 − )
, maximum amount of additional debt that the firm can undertake given its

performance in year 1 (retained earnings and cash flows).
, allowed amount of borrowing, given

,

capital structure ( ≤ 0.25).
, average interest rate.
, average principal repayment rate.
, average rate of return
,

=

,

+

,

,

and constraints on the firm’s
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,
,
,

=

,

=

+

,

,

=

,

,

, total assets in the firm at the beginning of year 2 (after additional borrowing).

,

, total liabilities in the firm at the beginning of year 2 (after additional

borrowing).
3.3 Model Assumptions
A set of initial and ongoing assumptions are made that simplify the model and preserve
the logic behind financial linkages in the simulation among the financial documents. It is
through the process of changing these conditions21 or base assumptions that meaningful
sensitivity analysis is performed.


Both generations agree on and assign a single child as the successor of the family
farm business.



The age differential between the older and younger generations is held constant at
twenty years of age.



Farms are assumed to be homogeneous with the differences in revenue coming solely
from differences in farmer productivity. 22



Capital structure of the business may vary during the planning horizon, but the firm’s
debt-to-asset ratio is capped at 0.25. Borrowing against valuation equity is allowed
provided that the firm’s capital structure, income and cash flows statements permit.

21

Model conditions and model assumptions are used interchangeably in this study.
Farmer productivity here includes the effect of technology use as well as efficiency gains on gross
revenue by a farmer as he/she ages.
22
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The business/accounting entity is the grain enterprise; thus, any assets or debt
obligations that are not related to the normal course of business in this enterprise are
not included in the financial documents. The only exception to this assumption is the
portion of off-farm income that can serve as a supplement for household consumption
withdrawals (Scenario 1 only).



Transfer of managerial responsibilities is a function of ownership structure in the
business and occurs at the same speed as the transfer of business ownership. This
assumption helps construct the joint farmer productivity index which is then used as a
scaling factor on the gross revenue entry in the Income Statement.



The initial ownership structure in the business is 80/20, with the older generation
controlling 80 percent and the younger – 20 percent of ownership interest. All profits
earned are split between these two generations according to their respective shares of
ownership.



Structure of assets (current to non-current) and farmland as a portion of fixed assets
remain constant through the planning horizon.



In the baseline scenario, the farm household (both older and younger generations) is
assumed to have no off-farm income available to cover family living expenses. This
assumption is relaxed in Scenarios 1.



Financial efficiency and profitability ratios remain unchanged throughout the planning
period.



The older generation is currently 71 years old (without a spouse) and two children.
According to the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the average size of family between 1960
and 1970 ranged between 3.57 and 3.70. Given the age of the primary operator who is
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also the head of the older generation’s household in the representative farm (71 years
old), his family unit would have been established between 1960 and 1970, and thus,
the above statistics was used to define the assumption on the family size.


When gifts are made, they occur at the end of the production year, altering the
ownership structure and consumption withdrawals for the next year. The normal gift
size has a value of $14,000 annually to each of the two children and their spouses
making a total of 4 gift recipients.



The 2012 U.S. Census of Agriculture, indicates that about 72 percent of large farms
(500 acres or more) are farmed as family farms, sole proprietorships. In this model the
legal status for tax purposes is a sole proprietorship. This is applied to both the older
and the younger generations.



The income tax bracket for each generation is defined based only on their share of
income generated in the business. The federal estate tax rates are based on 2016 tax
rates for married individuals filing jointly and surviving spouses (IRS 2016). Initially
the older generation’s tax rate is 33 percent for federal and 8.9 percent for state income
taxes. The younger generation’s rates are 25 percent and 7.9 respectively.



The baseline scenario conservatively assumes that the passing generation has only one
estate tax exemption of $5.45 million. This would be an example of the situation in
which the older generation is the surviving parent, and the deceased spouse’s
exemption was either previously used up or could not be transferred to the surviving
spouse.



In the baseline scenario, farmland values are held constant throughout the planning
horizon. The baseline is altered in Scenarios 4 and 5 where two alternative land value
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trends are applied. These trends are modelled based on the results of the Iowa Land
Survey. In this survey 75 percent of the respondents expect a land value decrease of
less than 5 percent in 2016. Their predictions for next five years where mixed with 32
percent expecting values to increase and 17 percent expecting values to remain
constant. In Scenario 4, farmland values decline in the first four years, and then
gradually recover for the remaining planning horizon. Scenario 5 suggests a more
severe decline in farmland values and has a slower recovery. Chapter 4 has the detailed
explanation of the various data sources and values used in the simulations.


Under proactive transition strategy, prior to the transfer initiation, the total farmer
productivity is adjusted for the younger generation’s productivity index, and the
younger generation can take out funds from the business to cover consumption, but
only up to their share of generated income in the business. After the transfer is
initiated, the total farmer productivity is adjusted for the younger generation’s
productivity index, and the younger generation’s consumption is fully covered by the
farm after the transfer is initiated.



Under regular transition strategy, prior to the transfer initiation, even though the
younger generation has some limited ownership in the business (initial assumption
20%), total farmer productivity is not adjusted for the younger generation’s
productivity index since they do not have managerial involvement in the farm, and the
business does not cover any of the younger generation’s family consumption. After
the transfer is initiated, the total farmer productivity is adjusted for the younger
generation’s productivity index, and the weights on both generations’ productivity
indices are modified. The younger generation’s consumption is fully covered by the
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farm after the transfer is initiated, whereas the older generation’s one is covered in full
under all scenarios.
3.4 Scenarios
The model generates results for the baseline scenario followed by a series of six
scenarios as a sensitivity analysis. These six scenarios are listed in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 Description of Scenarios.
Scenario
Baseline scenario
Scenario 1

Description
Explained below.
Available off-farm income is set at $47,353.

Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Scenario 4

Farm covers only 50% of younger generation’s consumption.
Farm covers only 80% of younger generation’s consumption.
Constant farmland value assumption is relaxed. Farmland values
experience a severe decline followed by a gradual conservative
recovery.
Scenario 5
Farmland values decline slower than in Scenario 4, and the land
market starts recovering sooner.
Scenario 6
Annual gifting becomes aggressive and increases to $25,000 per
person per year.
This study conducts analysis for two types of transition strategies (proactive and
regular). Thus, every scenario is re-run and analyzed separately for each type of transition
strategy. Below are explained major assumptions of the baseline scenario under both
types of transition strategy.
Proactive Transition Strategy
1.

The total farmer productivity index accounts for the productivity of both
generations even prior to the transfer initiation due to the fact that the younger
generation has some managerial involvement in the business even prior to the
farm transfer initiation. The adjustment of the total farmer productivity index
under this type of transition strategy is explained in Equation 5. Until the
transfer is initiated, the respective weights on the younger and the older
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generations’ productivity indices remain constant since no wealth is shifted
between the generations during that time. Prior to the transfer initiation, the
younger generation can take out funds from the business to cover its
consumption, but only up to their share of annual farm net income generated
in the business. After the transfer is initiated, the total farmer productivity is
adjusted annually for changes in both farmers’ productivity indices as they
age and changes in their respective weights that reflect the shift of wealth
between the two generations. The younger generation’s consumption is fully
covered by the farm after the transfer is initiated, whereas the older
generation’s one is covered in full prior and after the transfer initiation and
under all scenarios.
2. Constant farmland values ($8,716, Zhang 2015).
3. Normal gifting strategy ($14,000/year/person, Internal Revenue Service n.d.).
4. No off-farm income is available.
5. Weighted average cost of capital for the representative farm is (4.45%), used
as the discount rate.
Regular Transition Strategy
1. Prior to the transfer initiation total farmer productivity is not adjusted for the
younger generation’s productivity index. Until the transfer is initiated, the
younger generation is assumed to have 20% ownership in the farm business.
This is the case where they live off-farm and do not hold managerial
responsibilities. During this time, the farm business does not pay any of the
younger generation’s family consumption. After the transfer is initiated, the
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total farmer productivity is continually adjusted to include the younger
generation’s productivity index, and the weights on both farmers’
productivity indices are modified annually based on the changes in
ownership structure between two generations.
2. Assumptions 2, 3, 4, and 5 are identical as those found in the proactive
transition strategy.
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CHAPTER 4: DATA AND REPRESENTATIVE FARM
Strong financial performance of the farm sector over the last decade resulted in
highly-elevated farmland prices, increased capital investments, and strengthened the
overall equity positions of Midwestern grain operations. The growing size of operations
and a large percentage of near- or- after- retirement age farmers in the Midwestern states
is likely to lead to a large percentage of these farms undergoing an intergenerational
transfer over the next two decades. This research project is intended to provide social
benefit for this particular group of farms. Thus, the representative farm in this study is
defined as a large grain farm (with $4 million in equity or more) located in the Corn Belt
and Northern Plains.
Data
The farm-level data was obtained by a large lending institution 23 and contains
variables from the Income Statement and the Balance Sheet for grain farms in three
Midwestern states (Iowa, Nebraska, and South Dakota) that generate over $250,000 in
annual gross revenue. There were two different datasets: (1) a cross-section set with
1,427 observations for production years 2006 – 2015, and (2) a panel set with 294
observations from all three states including large and very large farms with at least 4
consecutive production years of observations. The cross-sectional data for production
years 2012 and 2013 was combined and studied together to understand the distribution of
farms in each state and determine the size of the representative farm and other KIVs.
Earlier production years (2006 – 2011) were not used because the issue studied in this
research project requires consideration of a current wealth position of the business and

23

The name of the institution cannot be disclosed due to the confidentiality agreement.
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not average or historic. Therefore, using the 2012 and 2013 years allows for capturing the
effect of the spike in farmland prices and increased capital investments in agriculture on
the wealth positions of grain farms. If production years 2013 through 2015 are selected,
the number of observations is reduced significantly. Once the representative farm size
was chosen, the 2006 through 2010 panel data for large farms was used to benchmark
historic financial performance of large farms against the performance exhibited in 2012
and 2013 by the representative farm. The size of the model24 farm and its key financial
variables were derived by taking the average of the respective variable for all farms in
the pre-defined subsample.
The Size and Location of the Representative Farm
While several alternative approaches for defining the boundaries of the
subsamples of large and very large farms in each state were considered, it was decided
that the equity approach with percentile distribution ranking was best suited to our
purposes. Further analysis of data indicated that each of the three states’ farms had
significant differences and must be studied separately. The Iowa group of large farms was
selected as the basis for this work.
Traditionally, the size of farms is measured in gross revenue generated by a firm
over a year (Hoppe and MacDonald 2013). The USDA currently defines a large farm as
the one that generates between $1 and $5 million in gross revenue, and very large farms –
over $5 million. When the USDA’s definition of a large farm is applied to the data, more
than 25 percent of observations in Iowa and Nebraska and 10 percent in South Dakota
have less than $4 million in farm equity (Table 4.1).

24

Two terms - model farm and representative farm – have identical meaning and are used interchangeably
in this study.
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Table 4.1 Distribution of Large Farms (by Equity), USDA Definition

1%
5%
10
25
50
75
90
95
99
Total observations

Iowa
1,657,512
2,422,702
2,748,241
3,890,447
5,940,676
8,369,890
12,500,000
14,000,000
22,200,000
90

Nebraska
1,753,275
2,403,221
2,901,583
3,469,870
4,902,536
7,587,673
12,100,000
12,400,000
19,200,000
41

South Dakota
1,936,857
2,488,238
3,012,535
4,977,912
6,195,605
9,821,475
14,800,000
101,000,000
108,000,000
30

One explanation for these lower equity positions could be that these farms rent a
significant portion of their operated acres. In addition, as shown in Table 4.2 the top 25 th
percentile of farms that generate between $250,000 and $1 million in all three states is
characterized by strong equity positions (over $4 million). As for the very large farms, in
each state less than 3 observations were found that generate over $5 million in gross
revenue. Thus, adopting the USDA definition would result in omitting the observations
for which the transfer issue is a concern and including observations with low equity
positions.
Table 4.2 Percentage of Farms listed by Equity that do not meet USDA’s Definition of
Large Farms (Gross Cash Farm Income between $250,000 and $1,000,000)

1%
5%
10
25
50
75
90
95
99
Total observations

Iowa
557,107
1,012,067
1,434,071
1,997,976
3,075,349
5,366,428
8,785,829
12,100,000
20,800,000
132

Nebraska
663,148
910,150
1,141,670
1,706,092
2,569,657
5,018,046
5,965,466
7,159,798
11,300,000
89

South Dakota
712,453
1,045,097
1,343,100
2,173,400
3,654,421
6,592,458
9,642,046
11,100,000
34,900,000
59
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Another potential approach to defining farm size is to use total farm assets. Given
that the transfer tax is applied to the terminal wealth, not the asset base, it seems most
logical to use the firm’s equity position as a measure of size. The subsamples of large and
very large farms in each state, were studied separately for shape, dispersion and
skewness. Major outliers were excluded, and a lower boundary of $4 million 25 was set.
The resulting sample (for each state separately) was split into two subsamples (large and
very large farms), using the percentile methodology. The first 75 percent of farms were
classed as large farms, and the remaining 25 percent as very large farms.
Table 4.3 Description of Subsamples of Large and Very Large Farms
Iowa
Total number of observations in
the sample
 observations with equity
greater $4 million
Boundaries for large farms
subsample, million $

Nebraska

South Dakota

225

134

90

119

61
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4 – 9.7
(90 obs.)

4 – 7.9
(46 obs.)

4 – 9.9
(39 obs.)

Boundaries for very large farms
9.7 – 25.3
7.9 – 28.1
9.9 – 108.32
subsample, million $
(29 obs.)
(15 obs.)
(13 obs.)
Table 4.3 shows the equity ranges (in millions of dollars) used as the bounds of
each subsample by state and size and lists in parenthesis the number of observations of
each subsample. For instance, Iowa has 119 out of 225 farm observations with equity
greater than $4 million. Based on the percentile ranking, large farms in Iowa are defined

25

This level was set as a lower bound because firms with low initial wealth positions (less than $4 million)
are less likely to generate and accumulate equity that would exceed the federal estate tax exemption of
$5.45 million at the end of the planning horizon. Thus, for those firms the transfer tax obligations are less
likely to be a concern; therefore, they are excluded.
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as those with equity between $4 and $9.7 million and very large farms – with equity
between $9.7 and $25.3 million.
Table 4.4 Selected Descriptive Statistics for the Size of Subsamples of Large and Very
Large Farms in Three States
Mean

Total Equity
Standard Deviation

Median

Iowa
6,172,080
1,518,765
5,940,676
 Large
14,300,000
4,166,562
13,100,000
 Very large
Nebraska
5,516,804
994,011
5,311,207
 Large
12,600,000
5,365,320
11,300,000
 Very large
South Dakota
6,295,235
1,375,128
6,267,966
 Large
28,700,000
34,500,000
11,400,000
 Very large
Using the above defined bounds (Table 4.1) for subsamples of large and very
large farms in each state, the descriptive statistics are obtained for each subsample and
provided in Table 4.3 for comparison purposes.
Very large farms are likely to use a different set of transfer strategies than large
farms and hire professionals to navigate them through the transition process. Lending
institutions and farm transition experts believe that the social benefit of this research lies
in studying the implications for large farms in particular. Therefore, this research will
focus solely on large farms.
As for the location of the representative farm, Iowa was selected and served as a
base state to define the parameters and the KIVs for the representative farm. First of all,
Iowa has by far the largest number of observations compared for 2012 and 2013
production years (90 observations in Iowa compared to 46 and 39 observations
respectively for Nebraska and South Dakota, Table 4.3). For the purpose of this research,
a subsample with larger number of observations is preferred since it allows one to better
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capture true representative characteristics of large grain farms in that region. Second of
all, observations from all three states should not be combined into one group and must be
studied as a single sample because they use varying production technologies (the
substantial presence of irrigation in row crop farms in Nebraska and South Dakota
compared to Iowa) and exhibit different operation efficiency. These states also have
different cropping patterns: South Dakota’s grain farms produce mostly wheat and corn,
compared to large corn and soybean production in Iowa and Nebraska. Statistical tests 26
for equality of sample means and variances were conducted for these three states (Iowa,
Nebraska, and South Dakota), and the results suggest the sample of large farms in
Nebraska is different (unequal means and variances) from Iowa and South Dakota,
whereas the latter two are more similar.
The comparison provided above leads to a conclusion that a large grain farm in
Iowa (with average equity of $6,172,080 as shown in Table 4.4) will serve as a base for
the representative farm. Finally, the subsample of farms is Iowa with equity between $4
and $9.7 million (with an average of $6,172,080) is used to determine key financial
variables that characterize the representative farm.
Other Characteristics of the Representative Farm
Table 4.5 lists the financial variables for the representative farm, calculated as the
average value of the respective variable in the defined subsample of large farms in Iowa.
The first three KIVs (total assets, current assets, and current liabilities) are used to
populate the Balance Sheet portion of the model in year 1.

26

Variance ratio test and two-sample t test with equal/unequal variances; these results are reported in
Appendix B, Tables 1 and 2.

65

Table 4.5 Definitions and Descriptive Statistics for Key Financial Variables and Ratios
that Define the Representative Farm
Mean
Total Assets
Current Assets
Current Liabilities
Operator Age
Real Estate Value
Gross Sales
Off-farm Income
Farm Living Expenses
Operating Expense Ratio (OER)
Interest Expense Ratio (IER)
Depreciation Expense Ratio (DER)
Asset Turnover Ratio (ATR)
Debt-to-Asset Ratio (D/A)

8,068,680
1,224,117
531,769
71
5,172,974
1,296,075
47,353
34,968
0.595
0.0613
0.10
0.156
0.22

Standard
Deviation
2,092,853
1,224,117
609,111
5
1,611,185
1,039,590
44,598
13,205
0.18
0.06
0.05
0.10
0.13

Median
7,583,840
994,452
345,391
69
4,953,518
1,042,921
38,513
30,000
0.62
0.05
0.09
0.13
0.20

When combined with appropriate financial ratios, i.e. interest expense, operating
expense, depreciation expense, and asset turnover ratios, these KIVs generate the entries
for the Income Statement portion of the model. A 20-year age differential is used to
approximated the age of a younger generation. The age along with other variables are
used to determine the annual consumption level for both generations and their respective
productivity indices.
Given that the above ratios and financial variables for the representative farm
were based on 2012 and 2013 production years, these estimated were compared to those
from the 2006-2010 period to check for concerns about overestimation.
As shown in Table 4.6, the asset turnover ratio calculated using 2012-2013 data
seems to be somewhat elevated compared to the historic average.
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Table 4.6. Comparison of Financial Ratios for Large Farms in Iowa: 2012-2013 and
2006-2010
Sample mean, 2006-2010
0.1285
0.6063
0.0950
0.0963

ATR
OER
IER
DER

Sample mean, 2012-2013
0.156
0.595
0.061
0.097

Thus, to use a more conservative scenario and preserve a representativeness of
large farm’s performance, the historic ATR for years 2006-2010 is used to populate the
model. All other ratios used in the model are for the 2012-2013 period.
Base Productivity Indices
The productivity indices for the respective age of a farmer are drawn from the statelevel empirical study by Tauer and Lordkipanidze (2000). The modelling approach in the
empirical study that produced these indices is explained in detail in Chapter 2, and the table
with indices is provided in Appendix B.
Consumption Withdrawals
The University of Minnesota’s Farm Financial Management Database (FINBIN) is
one of the most extensive databases for farm financial and production benchmark
information in the United States. This database is used to generate family living expenses
and populate the model in the Baseline and Scenarios 1 through 3. Several other sources 27
were used to benchmark the family living expenses found in FINBIN. As shown on Figure
1 in Appendix C, all sources have comparable values (Kansas Farm Management
Association (FMA) and FINBIN however appear to be in a closer range than Kentucky
Farm Business Management Program).
27

Kansas Farm Management Association, Kentucky Farm Business Management Program, Illinois Farm
Business Farm Management Association.
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Family living expenses include food and meals expense, medical care and
health/life insurance, household supplies/repairs, clothing, education, recreation, utilities,
dwelling rent, etc. For the complete list of items, please visit www.finbin.umn.edu
The Lookup table used the FINBIN data for 2013 crop farm values for the
Midwestern states of IL, MI, MN, NE, SD, MO, ND, OH, WI by the age of the operator
and the size of farm. Table 1, Appendix D explains the definition of the sizes of operations
adopted by FINBIN, and Table 2 in the same appendix provides family living expenses for
various ages and size categories used in the model.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS
A visual representation of how results are generated are shown in Figures 5.1A and
5.1B. The model generates results for two types of transition strategies (proactive and
regular) under the baseline and six other specified scenarios each tested for ten possible
periods of farm transfer initiation.
For each scenario, type of transition strategy and transfer initiation year, the model
generates two major sets of results: (1) the discounted terminal wealth position of the
business and (2) and key financial variables from major financial statements for each
production year within a planning horizon. The discounted terminal wealth positions are
ranked and used to determine the preferred timing for farm transfer initiation. The
recorded output variables (retained earnings, net income, consumption withdrawals,
principal payments, income and self-employment taxes, gross sales, total assets, joint
farmer productivity index, total before-tax wealth at the end of the planning period, and
transfer taxes) provide the background for a more in-depth analysis of the results. Figure
5.2 is an example of visual representation of these results where each bar represents
discounted terminal wealth in the business for the associated transfer initiation year as a
function of the transfer initiation year.
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Generated Results

Proactive Transition
Strategy

Regular Transition
Strategy

BASELINE SCENARIO

BASELINE SCENARIO

SCENARIO 1

SCENARIO 1

SCENARIO 2

SCENARIO 2

SCENARIO 3

SCENARIO 3

SCENARIO 4

SCENARIO 4

SCENARIO 5

SCENARIO 5

SCENARIO 6

SCENARIO 6

Figure 5.1A. Layout of Generated Results
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Figure 5.1B. Layout of Results under Each Scenario
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Figure 5.2. Terminal Wealth as a Function of Transfer Initiation Year
Additional output variables are recorded for every production year under each
transfer initiation year and scenario as shown on Figure 5.1B and are recorded in a form
similar to Table 5.1 (an empty templet) 28.These results help identify the underlying
reason of year-to-year changes in firm’s growth and accumulation of wealth under each
scenario and transfer initiation year.
Table 5.1. Financial KOVs, Baseline Scenario, Proactive Transition Strategy
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer
No
…
Variable
Initiation
Initiation
Initiation
Transfer
…
Year 1
Year 2
Year 9
Initiation
Retained earnings in year 1
Retained earnings in year 2
…...
Retained earnings in year 10
Net farm income in year 1
Net farm income in year 2
……
Net farm income in year 10
Consumption withdrawals in year 1
Consumption withdrawals in year 2
…….
Consumption withdrawals in year 10
Etc.

28

These results are not reported due to a lengthy format, but can be provided if requested.
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5.1 Baseline Scenario
Proactive Transition Strategy
If the business follows a proactive transition strategy, the results shown in Figure 5.3
suggest that the firm accumulates the highest terminal wealth if the initiation occurs in
year 6. Earlier or later transfer initiation leads to a lower discounted terminal wealth.
6,960,000
6,940,000
6,920,000
6,900,000
6,880,000
6,860,000
6,840,000
6,820,000
6,800,000

Figure 5.3. Discounted Terminal Wealth as a Function of Transfer Initiation Year
As shown in Table 5.2, year 1 initiation results in $109,796 lower total after-tax
wealth relative to year 6. An early transfer reduces the firm’s growth but offers tax
savings when compared to later initiation (year 6). However, these tax savings ($3,782)
are lower than the foregone total before-tax wealth ($113,578).
Therefore, for this growth rate and size of the operation, if the transfer is initiated in
year 1, transfer tax savings do not justify the reduction in the firm’s growth suggesting
that transfer initiation year 6 is preferred to year 1.
Compared to a later transfer initiation, year 9 after-tax wealth is higher if the transfer
is initiated in year 6 compared to year 9 suggesting that the earlier transfer is preferred.
Higher total after-tax wealth under transfer initiation year 6 compared to year 9 is due to
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large tax savings ($83,837) that almost double the foregone amount of total before-tax
wealth ($44,611), resulting in a $39,226 higher total after-tax wealth. In this case, tax
savings are large enough to offset the firm’s reduced growth rate.
Table 5.2. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Three Selected Transfer Initiation Years (1,
6 and 9)
Transfer initiation Transfer initiation
Change in
year 1 compared
year 6 compared
to year 6
to year 9
Total after-tax wealth, $
-109,796
39,226
(as percent of the first year of two that are
(1.57%)
(0.55%)
being compared)
 Total before-tax wealth, $
-113,578
-44,611


Transfer tax savings, $

3,782

83,837

Note: Absolute values for terminal wealth used to compute calculations are provided in Appendix G.

Results from both comparisons show that the earlier the transfer is initiated the lower
is the firm’s growth.
Table 5.3. Comparison of Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation Year
1 versus Year 6
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years 2 - 6
Production years 7 - 10
Retained earnings
-31.7
-3.6
Net income
-0.5
-1.5
Consumption withdrawals
19.0
0.0
Joint farmer productivity
0.00576
0.0

The numerical values in Table 5.3 were constructed in the following way: first, the
model was re-run for the baseline scenario, proactive transition strategy, for two transfer
initiation years (year 1 and 6). The key financial variables during the planning horizon
were recorded on an annual basis for all ten production years for transfer initiation years
1 and 6. Then, the differences for each variable on the annual basis were computed
comparing two given transfer initiation years. Most of the changes in the firm’s financial
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performance appear to occur between production years 2 and 6, thus the production years
were grouped as shown in Table 5.3.
The firm experiences a slower growth under transfer initiation year 1 compared to a
year 6 transfer, with the largest reduction occurring between production years 2 and 6 (on
average retained earnings were 31.7 percent lower in every year between production
years 2 and 6 under transfer initiation year 1 versus 6). Both factors - reduction in net
income and increase in consumption withdrawals – lowered retained earnings, but the
latter one was the major contributor of the slowdown in growth. In the first part of the
planning period (production years 2 – 6), the early transfer (year 1 compare to year 6)
significantly increased consumption withdrawals (on average, 19 percent annually), but
resulted in a very small increase in joint farmer productivity (less than 1 percent). An
earlier transfer initiation shifts wealth between the generations sooner and thus, increases
the weight on the younger generation’s base productivity index.
Table 5.4. Base Productivity Indices for Older and Younger Generations by Production
Year
Older generation’s base
Younger generation’s
Year
productivity index
base productivity index
Production year 1
1.060
1.088
Production year 2
1.060
1.081
Production year 3
1.060
1.074
Production year 4
1.060
1.067
Production year 5
1.060
1.060
Production year 6
1.060
1.060
Production year 7
1.060
1.060
Production year 8
1.060
1.060
Production year 9
1.060
1.060
Production year 10
1.060
1.060
Given that during these years, the younger generation’s base index is higher
compared to the older operator (Table 5.4), a larger weight on the younger generation’s
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base productivity index increases the joint farmer productivity index. However, such a
small increase in joint farmer productivity did not allow the firm to improve its income
generating ability to the extent that would justify higher consumption withdrawals.
In the second part of the planning horizon (production years 7 through 10), the firm
exhibits the same consumption withdrawal rates and joint farmer productivity indices
under both transfer initiation years. 29 (based on the empirical estimated by Tauer 2000,
and given the age of operators in this representative farm as shown in Table 5.3).
Table 5.5. Comparison of Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation Year
6 versus Year 9
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years 1 – 6
Production years 7 - 10
Retained earnings
0.00
-14.37
Net income
0.00
-0.23
Consumption withdrawals
0.00
11.00
Joint farmer productivity
0.00
0.00
As shown in Table 5.5, initiating the transfer in year 6 compared to year 9 results in
the reduction of the firm’s growth but only in the second part of the planning period.
Until production year 7, there are no differences in firm’s performance comparing these
two transfer initiation years since no transfer has been initiated yet. The transfer initiation
in year 6 has implications on firm’s performance starting in year 7, and under the
initiation in in year 9, the implications start in year 10. In the second part of the planning
periods (between production years 7 – 10), initiating the transfer in year 6 reduced the
firm’s retained earnings on average 14.37 percent annually compared to initiating in year
9. Since these two transfer initiation timings do not impact the joint farmer productivity

29

Linear interpolation was used to obtain the data points for productivity indices within the specific age
group. However, after age 65, the indices were kept constant (at a level provided in the study) given the
author’s concerns over the assumptions of the liquidation methods of the farm assets and their implications
on the farmer productivity index.
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index, the firm’s growth is reduced due to the larger consumption withdrawals under
transfer initiation year 6, and the lower income generating ability as a result of the
reduced asset base under earlier transfer initiation.
Comparing the changes in the firm’s growth under transfer initiation years 1, 6 and 9,
two major observations are made: (1) earlier transfer initiation allows the firm to
capitalize on the younger generation’s higher productivity in the first half of the planning
horizon, but is outweighed by significantly larger consumption withdrawals, and thus the
firm’s growth is reduced, and (2) when comparing two transfer initiation years that are
further away in the planning horizon (for example, years 6 to 9 rather than 1 to 6), the
change in firm’s growth between year 6 and 9 will be smaller than between 1 and 6 since
in the case of the first set of comparisons (year 6 versus 9) the farm has more production
years prior to transfer initiation when no additional consumption is placed on the
business, and it can use these funds to generate more wealth earlier in the planning
horizon.
Regular Transition Strategy
7,150,000
7,100,000
7,050,000
7,000,000
6,950,000
6,900,000
6,850,000

Figure 5.4. Terminal Wealth as a Function of Transfer Initiation Year
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From the financial standpoint, under the regular transition strategy, the delayed
transfer is always preferred since a later transfer initiation results in a higher level of
terminal wealth. When comparing transfer initiation years 1 versus 6, and years 6 versus
9, the reduction in total after-tax wealth is observed under earlier initiation (year 1
compared to year 6, and year 6 compared to year 9). Transfer tax savings associated with
earlier transfers do not justify the wealth foregone due to earlier transfer, resulting in a
lower total after-tax wealth under both comparisons.
Table 5.6. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Three Selected Transfer Initiation Years (1,
6 and 9)
Transfer initiation Transfer initiation
Change in
year 1 compared
year 6 compared to
to year 6
year 9
Total after-tax wealth, $
-208,939
-22,816
(as percent of the first year of two that
(2.97%)
(0.31%)
are being compared)
 Total before-tax wealth, $
-275,957
-135,954


Transfer tax savings, $

67,017

113,138

Note: Absolute values for terminal wealth used to compute calculations are provided in Appendix G.

As the firm’s transfer is delayed, the tax savings increase but are still not high
enough to compensate for the forgone wealth and change the decision on the timing of
initiation.
Table 5.7. Comparison of the Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation
Year 1 versus Year 6
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years Production years
1-6
7 – 10
Retained earnings
-63.35
-8.50
Net income
1.66
-3.74
Consumption withdrawals
43.39
0.00
Joint farmer productivity
0.00956
0.00
Total income and self-employment taxes
-5.36
-3.86
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Thus, for this size of estate and the firm’s growth, tax savings do not justify the
reduction in the firm’s growth. A lower total before-tax wealth under transfer initiation
year 1 versus 6 is explained using additional insights provided in Table 5.7. The largest
differences in retained earnings are observed between production years 1 and 6. Under
the earlier initiation (year 1 compared to year 6), the firm’s net (after-tax) income was on
average 1.66 percent higher during this part of the planning horizon which was primarily
due to higher joint farmer productivity and savings on income and self-employment
taxes. However, significantly larger consumption withdrawals (on average 43.39 percent
higher every year during this period under transfer initiation year 1 compared to year 6)
offset the increases in the net income and thus reduce the amount of wealth reinvested
back into business and the firm’s growth. In the second part of the planning period, we
see less difference in the firm’s retained earnings because the transfer has already been
initiated (under both years 1 and 6), and thus, the farm business incurs identical
consumption withdrawals and joint farmer productivity.
Table 5.8. Comparison of the Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation
Year 6 versus Year 9
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years Production years
1-6
7 - 10
Retained earnings
0.00
-41.25
Net income
0.00
1.81
Consumption withdrawals
0.00
37.74
Joint farmer productivity
0.00
0.00
Total income and self-employment taxes
0.00
-5.26
When comparing transfer initiation years 6 and 9, most of the decrease in retained
earnings is observed during the second part of the planning period (years 7 through 10)
since the firm’s performance is affected by the event of transfer initiation that occurs in
years 6 and 9. Following the same logic and analysis as provided above, initiating the
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transfer in year 6 versus 9 slightly improves income generating ability of the business
(1.81 percent higher on average when comparing transfer initiation years 6 and 9).
However, the firm’s retained earnings and growth are still reduced under the
earlier initiation because the effect of the increase in consumption withdrawals associated
with the earlier transfer initiation exceeds the increase in income generating ability of the
business. The magnitude of changes under these two transfer initiation years is lower than
under transfer initiation year 1 and 6 primarily due to the longer period the firm has been
operating without additional consumption withdrawals (financial performance of the firm
under these two transfer initiation years is identical until production year 7).
As the results show, the type of transition strategy employed by the company
(proactive or regular) impacts the magnitude and direction of results. Provided below are
major observations from the comparison of results for both types of transition strategies:
1. Under the regular transition strategy, earlier initiation reduces the firm’s growth
much more than under the proactive strategy (because of the differences in
assumptions on consumption and productivity between the strategies).
2. Generally, under the regular transition strategy, the firm generates higher total
after-tax wealth as a result of overall lower consumption withdrawals from the
business as specified by the assumption.
3. Preferred transfer timing differs depending on the type of transition strategy prior
to the transfer initiation: under proactive strategy, there is an optimal timing for
transfer (years 4 through 7), while under regular transition strategy, delay is
always preferred.
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5.2 Scenario One
Proactive Transition Strategy
Figure 5.5 shows that the availability of off-farm income to help cover the
younger generation’s consumption indeed alters the preferred timing of the farm transfer
intiation. Under scenario 1, plotting the resultsing terminal wealth as a function of
transfer intiation year shows that the highest bars are concentrated on the left of Figure
5.5 implying that earlier trasnfer initiation will result in higher terminal wealth generated
in the business.
7,300,000
7,200,000
7,100,000
7,000,000
6,900,000

Baseline

6,800,000

Scenario 1

6,700,000
6,600,000

Figure 5.5. Terminal Wealth as a Function of Transfer Initiation Year
The additional income stream not only changes the preferred timing of initiation
(compared to the baseline) but also the magnitude of results which we will discuss
shortly.
Numerical results from Table 5.9 support the general conclusion provided above:
total after-tax wealth is higher if transfer occurs earlier. Under transfer initiation year 1,
total after-tax wealth is $126,752 higher than under transfer initiation year 6. If initiated
in year 6 compared to year 9, the firm would generate $72,013 more in total after-tax
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wealth. Based on the decomposition of terminal wealth into its main elements, it
becomes apparent that for both comparisons most of the difference in total after-tax
wealth results from potential tax savings rather than higher total before-tax wealth (in
other words, the decision is driven by transfer tax savings more than by the firm’s
improved growth). For example, if transfer is initiated in year 1 (compared to year 6), the
firm generates only $267 more in total before-tax wealth. However, the earlier transfer
initiation in this case would result in $126,485 less in transfer taxes paid compared to the
tax obligation under transfer initiation year 6.
Table 5.9. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Three Selected Transfer Initiation Years (1,
6 and 9)
Change in
Total after-tax wealth, $
(as percent of the first year of two that
are being compared)
 Total before-tax wealth, $


Transfer tax savings, $

Transfer initiation Transfer initiation
year 1 compared
year 6 compared to
to year 6
year 9
126,752
72,013
(1.69%)
(0.97%)
267
126,485

1,440
70,573

Note: Absolute values for terminal wealth used to compute calculations are provided in Appendix G.

When comparing two transfer initiation years that are later in the planning horizon
(years 6 and 9), the magnitude of the differences changes but most of benefits of early
transfer still come from tax savings and not improvements in the firm’s growth.
The numerical results from Tables 5.10 and 5.11 support the in-depth explanation
of how the transfer initiation timing impacts the firm’s ability to generate and accumulate
wealth throughout the planning horizon.
Generally, the differences in the firm’s income generating and saving abilities
were very small (less than 1 percent) when comparing the specified sets of transfer
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initiation years (1 versus 6, and 6 versus 9) which also explains a small difference in total
before-tax wealth shown in Table 5.9 ($267 and $1,440) relative to the size of the
business.
Table 5.10. Comparison of the Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation
Year 1 versus Year 6
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years Production years
1-6
7 - 10
Retained earnings
0.11
-0.001
Net income
0.08
-0.07
Consumption withdrawals
0.00
0.00
Joint farmer productivity
0.00953
0.00
Total assets
0.0032
0.0124
Total income and self-employment taxes
-0.08
0.135
A slightly faster growth (on average 0.11 percent annually higher retained
earnings) under transfer initiation year 1 compared to year 6 is due to a small increase in
net income. This is a result of the firm’s ability to capitalize on the higher productivity of
the younger generation earlier in the planning period without imposing additional
consumption withdraws.
Table 5.11. Comparison of the Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation
Year 6 versus Year 9
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years Production years
1-6
7 - 10
Retained earnings
0.00
0.00268
Net income
0.00
0.19
Consumption withdrawals
0.00
0.00
Joint farmer productivity
0.00
0.00
Total assets
0.00
0.0055
Total income and self-employment taxes
0.00
-0.292
Earlier initiation also reduces income tax obligations and thus increases the amount of
assets retained in the business, allowing the firm to generate higher gross revenue in the
following periods, thus improving its income generating ability. Comparing transfer
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initiation years 6 and 9, changes in the firm’s growth are observed only in the later part of
the planning horizon30 and result from a higher net income (on average 0.19 percent
annually) generated by the business. Farmer productivity and consumption withdrawals
remained unchanged between these two transfer initiation years. The earlier transfer
initiation shifts income to a lower income tax bracket of the younger generation, reducing
income tax obligations (by 0.092 percent) and allowing the firm to retain more assets in
the business (0.0055 percent).
Regular Transition Strategy
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Figure 5.6. Terminal Wealth as a Function of Transfer Initiation Year
The availability of off-farm income when the regular transition strategy is employed
changes the magnitude and directionality of results: earlier transfer initiation allows the
firm to generate higher total-after tax wealth in the business than the later transfer, and
thus, delaying the transfer reduces the firm’s total after-tax wealth. The comparison and

30

Transfer initiation does not impact the firm’s performance in the year when it was initiated since the
initiation is modelled to occur at the end of the production year and thus, it affects the firm in the year
following the transfer initiation. No differences were observed during production years 1 through 6 since
both transfer initiation timings start impacting the firm’s performance in year 7.
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interpretation of the differences between the baseline and scenario 1 will be explained
shortly.
Similarly to the results of the baseline scenario, the majority of difference in total
after-tax wealth under scenario 1 comes primarily from potential transfer tax savings
irrespective of the transfer initiation years that are being compared (as shown in Table
5.12). However, it is important to note that when off-farm income is available, the early
initiation does not reduce the firm’s growth as much as it does under the baseline
scenario. If the transfer is initiated later in the planning horizon (year 6 versus 9), the
earlier transfer actually increases the firm’s growth.
Table 5.12. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Three Selected Transfer Initiation Years
(1, 6 and 9)
Transfer Initiation Transfer Initiation
Change in
Year 1 compared Year 6 compared to
to year 6
year 9
Total after-tax wealth, $
126,210
79,829
(as percent of the first year of two that are
(1.68%)
(1.08%)
being compared)
-1,217
12,931
 Total before-tax wealth, $
127,427
66,897
 Transfer tax savings, $
Note: Absolute values for terminal wealth used to compute calculations are provided in Appendix G.

Initiating the transfer in year 1 compared to year 6 under scenario 1 results in $1,217
less of total before-tax wealth but gives $127,427 of transfer tax savings. When initiating
the transfer in year 1 compared to year 6, a slowdown in the firm’s growth is observed
due to larger consumption withdrawals (on average 8.92 percent higher in each year) in
the first six years of the planning horizon (until the transfer initiation in year 6 is
enacted).
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Table 5.13. Comparison of the Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation
Year 1 versus Year 6
Average Change, %
Change in
Production years
Production years
1-6
7 - 10
Retained earnings
-0.12
-0.11
Net income
2.83
-0.08
Consumption withdrawals
8.92
0.00
Joint farmer productivity
0.0095
0.00
Total assets
-0.02
-0.01
Total income and self-employment taxes
-4.03
0.10
Even though the early transfer allows the firm to capitalize on higher joint farmer
productivity (0.0095 percent on average) during the first part of the planning period,
additional productivity in combination with lower income taxes (4.03 percent lower on
average) allows the firm to generate higher net farm income. But this addition to income
is not large enough to offset additional consumption withdrawals which reduces the
firm’s growth and total before-tax wealth.
Table 5.14. Comparison of the Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation
Year 6 versus Year 9
Average Change, %
Change in
Production years
Production years
1-6
7 - 10
Retained earnings
0.00
2.45
Net income
0.00
2.72
Consumption withdrawals
0.00
3.37
Joint farmer productivity
0.00
0.00
Total assets
0.00
0.08
Total income and self-employment taxes
0.00
-4.097
Under transfer initiation year 6 versus 9, the firm’s performance is not affected by the
transfer in the first part of the planning horizon, but starting in year 7, higher
consumption withdrawals (on average 3.37 annually) associated with the early transfer
are indeed justified by a 2.72 percent higher net income annually. Lower income and self-
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employment taxes and higher total assets were two main contributors to the increase in
net income, as shown in Table 5.14.
Table 5.15. Comparison of KOVs under the Baseline and Scenario 1
Transfer
Transfer
Change in
initiation year 1 initiation year 9
Total after-tax wealth, $
-502,379
-233,042
-502,379
-342,482
 Total before-tax wealth, $
0.00
109,440
 Transfer tax savings, $
Average annual retained earnings, %
-71.18
-39.01
Average annual net income, %
-2.95
-1.84
Average annual consumption withdrawals, %
45.47
36.44
Average annual total farmer productivity, %
0.0000435
0.00
Numerical evidence in Table 5.15 provides an insight into the differences in the
magnitude of terminal wealth under baseline scenario and scenario 1. Under the baseline
scenario, irrespective of transfer initiation year, the firm’s growth is reduced by higher
consumption withdrawals compared to scenario1. Comparing transfer initiation year 1
under both scenarios shows that the lower terminal wealth stems only from the lower
total before-tax wealth, and no tax savings are provided by the earlier initiation under the
baseline compared to transfer initiation year 1. Other key financial variables provided in
the table above provide evidence to conclude that early transfer initiation under scenario
1 (compared to the baseline scenario) improves the firm’s growth (on average 71.18
percent higher retained earnings every year compared to the baseline scenario), and the
increase is due to a higher income-generating ability of the business and significantly
lower consumption withdrawals. The further the initiation is delayed, the lower the
difference in the terminal wealth under these two scenarios driven by higher transfer tax
savings under the baseline scenario compared to scenario 1.
Comparing the baseline scenario to scenario 1 reveals that the baseline scenario
results in a significantly lower terminal wealth when regular transition strategy is used
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(primarily due to the firm’s reduced growth resulting from significantly higher
consumption withdrawals throughout the planning period under the baseline scenario).
Table 5.16. Comparison of Terminal Wealth and Other Key Financial Variables for
Baseline and Scenario 1
Transfer
Transfer
Change in
initiation year 1 initiation year 9
Total after-tax wealth, $
-470,138
-32,344
-470,977
-47,36
 Total before-tax wealth, $
839
15,008
 Transfer tax savings, $
-60.54
-5.2
Average annual retained earnings, %
-3.57
0.00
Average annual net income, %
38.58
4.89
Average annual consumption withdrawals, %
0.00002
0.00
Average annual total farmer productivity, %
Withdrawals reduce the firm’s asset base, gross revenue, and the firm’s income
generating ability. Thus, retained earnings in the business are lowered by both (1) lower
income and (2) higher consumption withdrawals, similarly to the case of the proactive
transition strategy.
The above analysis and discussion suggest the following:
1. Availability of off-farm income changes the directionality and the magnitude of
results for both types of transition strategy compared to the baseline.
2. Under this scenario, significantly lower consumption withdrawals (compared to
the baseline scenario) improve income generating and saving abilities of the firm.
Thus, a higher growth rate (compared to the baseline) results in higher absolute
value of terminal wealth accumulated in the business under any transfer initiation
year when off-farm income is available.
3. Within the scenario 1, regardless of the type of transition strategy, earlier transfer
is always preferred and is triggered primarily by large tax savings associated with
earlier transfer initiation years. Some improvements are observed in the firm’s
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income generating ability when transfer is initiated earlier (due to the firm’s
ability to capitalize on the younger generation’s higher productivity in early years
and to reduce income and self-employment taxes), but their magnitude is small.
5.3 Scenarios Two and Three
Proactive Transition Strategy
Both scenarios 2 and 3 study the responsiveness of the timing of farm transfer
initiation to changes in the same variable (consumption withdrawals from the business)
but tests different levels of withdrawals 31. Therefore, to provide a better comparative
analysis, results for both scenarios are presented and interpreted together in this section.
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Figure 5.7. Terminal Wealth as a Function of Transfer Initiation Year
The visual results presented on the Figure 5.7 show that the level of consumption
withdrawals indeed affects terminal wealth in the business and thus preferred timing of
farm transfer initiation. As consumption withdrawals from the business increase (from
scenario 1 to scenario 2 to scenario 3), the preferred timing of transfer initiation moves
31

50 percent and 80 percent of the younger generation’s consumption is assumed to be covered by the farm
business under scenario 2 and 3, respectively
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from early to the mid-period range. Under scenario 2, the early transfer is still preferred,
but the difference in terminal wealth between transfer initiation year 1 through 4 are not
very significant (for example, total after-tax wealth under transfer initiation year 1 is only
$2,469 higher than under year 4) which explains the almost flat left part of the histogram
of terminal wealth positions in Figure 5.7. When the farm covers almost all of the
consumption of the younger generation (80 percent under scenario 3), the terminal wealth
peaks in year 5, slightly earlier than under the baseline scenario.
Table 5.17. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Three Selected Transfer Initiation Years
(1, 4 and 9), Scenario 2
Transfer initiation Transfer initiation
Change in
year 1 compared
year 4 compared to
to year 4
year 9
Total after-tax wealth, $
2,351
119,870
(as percent of the first year of two that
(0.03%)
(1.65%)
are being compared)
 Total before-tax wealth, $
-118
1,365


Transfer tax savings, $

2,469

118,505

Note: Absolute values for terminal wealth used to compute calculations are provided in Appendix G.

As shown in Table 5.17, the difference in terminal wealth is mostly driven by transfer
tax savings associated with the earlier transfer and not the changes in the firm’s growth.
Table 5.18. Comparison of the Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation
Year 1 versus Year 4, Scenario 2
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years
Production years 5
1-4
- 10
Retained earnings
0.11
-0.001
Net income
0.06
-0.05
Consumption withdrawals
0.00
0.00
Joint farmer productivity
0.01437
0.00
Total assets
0.0012
0.0090
Total income and self-employment
-0.04
-0.002
taxes
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The results show relatively small changes in total before-tax wealth of $118 and
$1,365 but larger transfer tax savings of $2,469 and $118,505 when comparing transfer
initiation years 1 versus 4, and 4 versus 9. Taking a closer look at two timings of farm
transfer initiations (year 1 and year 4), shows that the firm experiences a slightly better
income generating ability in the first part of the planning horizon under transfer initiation
year 1 versus 4 (primarily driven by slightly higher joint farmer productivity, lower
income and self-employment taxes, and as a result a higher asset base) and then slows
down due to the increase in income and self-employment taxes paid (the younger
generation moved up to a higher income tax bracket).
Table 5.19. Comparison of Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation Year
4 versus Year 9, Scenario 2
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years
Production years
1-4
5 - 10
Retained earnings
0.00
0.002
Net income
0.00
0.13
Consumption withdrawals
0.00
0.00
Joint farmer productivity
0.00
0.00
Total assets
0.00
0.0042
Total income and self-employment
0.00
-0.153
taxes
Comparing the impact of transfer initiation year 4 versus 9 on the firm’s growth
shows that the earlier initiation (year 4) slightly improves the firm’s income generating
ability which is again primarily driven by lower income and self-employment taxes and
thus a higher asset base. However, it is important to note that these changes in the firm’s
performance are small in relative terms and do not exceed 1 percent. Thus, for this size of
estate and the growth rate experienced under this scenario, the transfer tax savings
associated with earlier transfer initiation justify the earlier transfer, but with a marginal
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difference in terminal wealth between the transfer initiation years 1 through 4 which
explains a relatively flat left side of the histogram. A steeper decline on the right side of
the histogram of terminal wealth (as a function of transfer initiation year) is due to the
fact that the firm has less time to shift wealth to the younger generation resulting in
higher transfer tax savings compared to transfer initiation years later in the planning
horizon.
Table 5.20. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Three Selected Transfer Initiation Years
(1, 5 and 9), Scenario 3
Transfer initiation Transfer initiation
Change in
year 1 compared
year 5 compared to
to year 5
year 9
Total after-tax wealth, $
-44,530
70,124
-44,530
-20,528
 Total before-tax wealth, $
0
90,652
 Transfer tax savings, $
Increasing the portion of the younger generation’s consumption to be covered by
the farm business leads to a later preferred transfer initiation timing compared to
scenarios 1 and 2.
Table 5.21. Comparison of Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation Year
1 versus Year 5, Scenario 3
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years
Production years 6
1–5
- 10
Retained earnings
-10.46
-1.25
Net income
-0.12
-0.62
Consumption withdrawals
8.15
1.45
Joint farmer productivity
0.01152
0.00
Total assets
-0.19
-0.60
Total income and self-employment
-0.26
-0.56
taxes
If initiated in year 1 compared to year 5, higher consumption withdrawals (8.15
percent) and lower income generating ability (0.12 percent) associated with early transfer
reduces the firm’s growth. Also, given this size of accumulated estate, the earlier transfer
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does not provide any transfer tax savings; thus terminal wealth is lower under transfer
initiation year 1 versus year 5. Therefore, year 5 is preferred to year 1.
Comparing transfer years 5 and 9, the firm experiences slower growth under earlier
transfer initiation (due to higher average consumption withdrawals and lower income
generating ability of the business), but delaying the transfer beyond year 5 results in
higher transfer tax obligations.
Table 5.22. Comparison of the Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation
Year 5 versus Year 9, Scenario 3
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years Production years
1-5
6 - 10
Retained earnings
0.00
-4.8
Net income
0.00
-0.07
Consumption withdrawals
0.00
4.46
Joint farmer productivity
0.00
-0.16
Total assets
0.00
0.00
Total income and self-employment taxes
0.00
-0.31
Thus, transfer tax savings associated with earlier transfer justify the reduction in
total before-tax wealth and thus result in higher terminal wealth under transfer initiation
year 5 compared to 9.
Regular Transition Strategy
According to the results depicted on Figure 5.8, for the regular transition strategy,
relaxing the assumption on the level of consumption of the younger generation covered
by the firm changes the preferred timing of the transfer initiation.
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Figure 5.8. Terminal Wealth as a Function of Transfer Initiation Year
Under scenario 2, initiating the transfer earlier or after year 3 will generate a lower
terminal wealth in the business for this strategy. However, under scenario 3, when a
higher portion of consumption (80 percent) is assumed to be covered by the business, the
histogram of terminal wealth positions shifts back to the right and undertakes the shape of
the histogram under the baseline scenario, suggesting to further delay the transfer.
Table 5.23. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Three Selected Transfer Initiation Years
(1, 3 and 9)
Transfer Initiation
Transfer Initiation
Change in
Year 1 compared
Year 3 compared
to year 3
to year 9
Total after-tax wealth, $
-48,870
57,487
(as percent of the first year of two that
(0.67%)
(0.78%)
are being compared)
-52,142
-126,982
 Total before-tax wealth, $
3,272
184,469
 Transfer tax savings, $
Note: Absolute values for terminal wealth used to compute calculations are provided in Appendix G.

Analyzing the impact of timing of farm transfer initiation under scenario 2 on the
firm’s financial performance, in particular the ability to generate and accumulate wealth
(firm growth), the following observations are made based on the numerical results
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provided in Tables 5.23 through 5.25. In the first part of the planning horizon, the early
transfer initiation (year 1 versus year 3) slows down the firm’s growth and does not offer
large transfer tax savings, thus reducing terminal wealth in the business. In the second
part of the planning horizon, the earlier transfer (year 3 versus 9) further reduces the
firm’s growth but provides high tax savings that justify the amount of total before-tax
wealth foregone associated with the earlier transfer. Thus, transfer year 3 is preferred to
transfer year 9.
Table 5.24. Comparison of the Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation
Year 1 versus Year 3
Average Change, %
Change in
Production years
Production years
1-3
4 - 10
Retained earnings
-16.05
-1.22
Net income
2.25
-0.71
Consumption withdrawals
23.85
0.00
Joint farmer productivity
0.01339
0.00164
Total assets
-0.11
-0.68
Total income and self-employment taxes
-3.01
-0.63
In the second part of the planning horizon, the earlier transfer (year 3 versus 9) further
reduces the firm’s growth but provides high tax savings that justify the amount of total
before-tax wealth foregone associated with the earlier transfer. Thus, transfer year 3 is
preferred to transfer year 9. For this growth rate and size of estate, transfer tax savings for
early years do not justify the earlier transfer. In later years however, as the business
approaches the end of the planning horizon, the transfer tax savings associated with
earlier transfer increase and thus, further delay is not advisable.
As shown in Table 5.26, changing the assumption on the level of consumption
withdrawals also alters the magnitude of results.
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Table 5.25. Comparison of the Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation
Year 3 versus Year 9
Average Change, %
Change in
Production years
Production years
1-3
4 - 10
Retained earnings
0.00
-17.83
Net income
0.00
2.13
Consumption withdrawals
0.00
29.33
Joint farmer productivity
0.00
0.00080
Total assets
0.00
-0.89
Total income and self-employment taxes
0.00
-5.59
Most of the difference in terminal wealth between scenario 1 and 2, and 1 and 3
comes from the changes in total before-tax wealth. Comparing the transfer initiation year
1 under scenarios 1 versus 2 and scenarios 1 versus 3 shows that the firm generates
higher total before-tax wealth under scenarios with lower consumption withdrawals.
Higher joint farmer productivity (under scenarios 2 and 3 compared to scenario 1) does
not justify higher consumption withdrawals and thus results in lower terminal wealth
under scenarios 2 and 3 compared to scenario 1. The absolute difference in terminal
wealth between scenario 1 and 3 is greater than between scenarios 1 and 2 due to higher
consumption withdrawals.
Table 5.26. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Transfer Initiation Year 1 Under Selected
Scenarios
Scenario 1 and
Scenario 1 and
Change in
Scenario 2
Scenario 3
Total after-tax wealth, $
213,416
367,434
(as percent of the first year of two that are
(2.85%)
(4.9%)
being compared)
214,255
368,273
 Total before-tax wealth, $
839
839
 Transfer tax obligations $
Average annual consumption withdrawals, %
-36.78
-62.93
Average annual joint farmer productivity, %
-0.00001
-0.00002
The following concluding thoughts summarize the analysis provided above:
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1. The directionality and magnitude of results are responsive to the level of
consumption withdrawals under both transition strategies.
2. As consumption withdrawals from the farm increase, the preferred timing of
transfer initiation gradually moves away from earlier years (as suggested by
scenario 1) and finally approaches the preferred timing as suggested by the
baseline scenario for the respective types of transition strategy.
3. When higher consumption withdrawals are taken out from the farm (moving from
the scenario 2 to 3), earlier transition initiation reduces the firm’s income
generating and saving ability irrespective of the type of transition strategy
compared to later transition initiation years. Thus, the preferred timing of transfer
initiation depends on whether tax savings associated with the earlier transfer can
offset the firm’s growth foregone.
5.4 Scenario Four
Proactive Transition Strategy
Relaxing the assumption on constant farmland prices (assuming a more
pessimistic land market outlook) changes the magnitude and directionality of results
compared to the baseline scenario.
Under this scenario the results suggest that the delayed transfer is preferred since
(as shown on Figure 5.9) delaying the transfer from year 1 to year 9 will result in about a
$200,000 higher discounted terminal wealth position in the business. Regardless of the
transfer initiation time, under this scenario the firm does not incur any transfer tax
obligations since these terminal wealth positions do not exceed the lifetime estate and gift
exemption amount.
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Figure 5.9. Discounted Terminal Wealth as a Function of Transfer Initiation Year
The decomposition of the differences in total after-tax wealth under three transfer
initiation years provided in Table 5.27 shows that the difference comes primarily from
the total before-tax wealth (no transfer tax savings are observed) suggesting that the
timing of farm transfer initiation indeed impacts the firm’s financial performance and
thus firm’s growth and size of estate to be transferred.
Table 5.27. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Three Transfer Initiation Years (1, 6, 9)
Transfer initiation Transfer initiation
Change in
year 1 compared
year 6 compared to
to year 6
year 9
Total after-tax wealth, $
-165,610
-74,430
(as percent of the first year of two that
(2.56%)
(1.12%)
are being compared)
-165,610
-74,430
 Total before-tax wealth, $
0
0
 Transfer tax savings, $
Note: Absolute values for terminal wealth used to compute calculations are provided in Appendix G.

Under this scenario, earlier transfer always results in lower total before- and aftertax wealth: initiating transfer in year 1 compared to year 6 results in $165,610 lower total
after-tax wealth. The same holds true for the comparison of transfer initiation years 6 and
9, but the magnitude of the change is smaller. Thus, this allows us to conclude that the
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shape of the histogram of terminal wealth positions as a function of transfer initiation
year is driven primarily by the impact of transfer initiation time on the firm’s ability to
generate and accumulate wealth (or the firm’s growth). To support this conclusion, a
closer look was taken at the firm’s financial performance on an annual basis within the
planning period under various transfer initiation years.
The analysis of the numerical results provided in the tables below allows to
conclude that within a given scenario, the earlier transfer initiation lowers the income
generating ability of the business and incurs higher consumption withdrawals thus
reducing the firm’s growth.
Table 5.28. Comparison of the Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation
Year 1 versus Year 6
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years Production years
1-6
7-10
Retained earnings
-57.95
-7.5
Net income
-0.66
-2.3
Consumption withdrawals
20.25
0.00
Joint farmer productivity
0.01066
0.00
Total assets
-0.77
-2.47
Total income and self-employment taxes
-0.89
-2.75
The earlier transfer initiation slows down the firm’s growth because the improved
joint farmer productivity and income tax savings are not large enough to enhance income
generating ability of the business to the extent that it can justify the increased
consumption withdrawals.
Comparing transfer initiation year 1 to 6, income generating ability of the firm
declined due to a decrease in the asset base (under transfer initiation year 1, in the first
part of the planning horizon, consumption withdrawals on average were 20 percent
higher compared to the withdrawals under transfer initiation year 6). The increases in
joint farmer productivity and the availability of income tax savings could not offset the
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impact of the reduced asset base on the firm’s gross revenue and net income; thus, on
average the firm experienced 0.66 percent lower net income between production years 1
and 6 under transfer initiation in year 1 versus 6.
Comparing transfer years 6 and 9, the earlier transfer initiation still suppresses the
firm’s growth but to a lower extent since there are fewer periods between transfer
initiation years. As in the previous case, the reductions in retained earnings results from a
lower income generating ability of the business (on average 0.51 percent lower income
on annual basis) and higher consumption withdrawals (on average 16.5 percent higher
annually).
Table 5.29. Comparison of the Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation
Year 6 versus Year 9
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years Production years
1-6
7 - 10
Retained earnings
0.00
-39.08
Net income
0.00
-0.51
Consumption withdrawals
0.00
16.05
Joint farmer productivity
0.00
0.00
Total assets
0.00
-0.58
Total income and self-employment taxes
0.00
-0.70
Some income tax savings are available when comparing transfer initiation years 6
and 9, but they are not sufficient to offset the negative impact of a lower asset base. Thus,
earlier transfer lowers income generating ability of the firm. Given that farmland is the
largest category of assets used in production agriculture, changes in farmland prices
impact owner equity in the business as well as the firm’s asset base and thus its future
financial performance.
As shown in Table 5.30, the timing of transfer impacts the change in valuation
equity in the business which in turn determines the next period’s dollar value of the asset
base, and thus the firm’s future financial performance.

100

Table 5.30. Change in Valuation Equity by Production Year under Transfer Initiation
Years 1, 6, and 9
Transfer
Transfer
Transfer
Initiation
Initiation
Initiation
Year 1
Year 6
Year 9
Production year 1
(510,923)
(510,923)
(510,923)
Production year 2
(216,689)
(216,689)
(216,689)
Production year 3
(269,787)
(270,956)
(270,956)
Production year 4
(259,074)
(261,379)
(261,379)
Production year 5
(248,626)
(252,050)
(252,050)
Production year 6
119,218
121,481
121,481
Production year 7
103,102
105,591
105,591
Production year 8
322,538
330,458
331,867
Production year 9
392,891
402,688
405,919
Production year 10
284,239
291,428
294,662
Under earlier transfer initiation years, the firm grows slower and thus will incur
lower valuation losses (in absolute amount) during the downturn in farmland prices
compared to later transfer initiation years, but will also capitalize less on the increases in
farmland prices when the land market recovers.
For example, if transfer is initiated in year 1, the firm will have $6,898 less in
downward adjustment32 of valuation equity compared to transfer year 6, and $29,658 less
of upward adjustment in valuation equity when farmland prices level off and start
increasing compared to transfer initiation year 6. These adjustments in valuation equity
slow down the firm’s growth and reduce the dollar value of the owner’s equity in the
business. Furthermore, the decline in owner’s equity lowers the size of the estate to be
transferred to the younger generation to the level that that does not trigger transfer taxes.
Thus, early initiation neither offers transfer tax savings, nor improves the firm’s growth
which suggests delayed transfer.

32

The value is the difference between the sum of all valuation equity adjustments during production years 1
– 5 under transfer initiation year 1 minus the sum of all valuation equity adjustments during production
years 1 – 5 under transfer initiation year 6.

101

The intuition for the differences in results under the baseline scenario and
scenario 4 is provided below and is based on the numerical results in Table 5.31. Under
the baseline scenario, the firm generates a significantly higher total after-tax wealth
($539,278 more) than under scenario 4. Under both scenarios, the firm does not incur any
transfer tax obligations, thus the difference in total after-tax wealth stems only from total
before-tax wealth implying the firm’s higher growth rate under the baseline scenario
compared to scenario 4. Between these two scenarios, only one assumption is relaxed
(farmland prices), thus, the difference in terminal wealth position between these two
scenarios results from changes in valuation equity and its impact on the firm’s growth. As
shown in Table 5.31, under scenario 4, the firm experiences a reduction in its asset base
due to a negative adjustment in valuation equity of $1,505,099 compared to no
adjustment under the baseline. This reduction contracted the firm’s growth and reduced
the firm’s wealth position compared to the baseline scenario. When the land market
recovers, the firm adjusts upward its asset base, but by a smaller amount ($1,221,989).
Table 5.31 Comparison of Selected KOVs for Transfer Initiation Year 1
Baseline Scenario
6,998,955
6,998,955
0

Scenario 4
6,459,677
6,459,677
0

Total after-tax wealth, $
 Total before-tax wealth, $
 Transfer tax savings, $
Total change in valuation equity, $
0
-1,505,099
 During production years 1 – 5
0
1,221,989
 During production years 5 - 10
Thus, the net effect of changes in valuation equity on the firm’s growth and size of
estate result in a lower terminal wealth when transfer is initiated in year 1 under scenario
4 compared to the baseline scenario.
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Regular Transition Strategy
Relaxing the assumption on farmland prices (allowing prices to vary from year to
year) does not change the directionality of results for regular transition strategy, but alters
their magnitude.
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Figure 5.10. Discounted Terminal Wealth as a Function of Transfer Initiation Year
Terminal wealth positions for all transfer initiation years under scenario 4 are lower
compared to the respective wealth positions under the baseline scenario, and these
changes will be discussed shortly. Under this scenario, the earlier transfer initiation will
always result in lower terminal wealth in the business suggesting it is better to delay the
transfer to the end of the planning horizon.
Based on the evidence from Table 5.32, total before-tax wealth is a major source of
the decline in terminal wealth when comparing transfer initiation years 1 versus 6, and 6
versus 9, implying that earlier transfer initiation reduces the firm’s growth.
Earlier transfer provides some transfer tax savings when comparing transfer initiation
years in the second part of the planning horizon (e.g., years 6 and 9), but they are not
significant enough to justify the slowdown in the firm’s growth caused by earlier transfer.
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Thus, delaying the transfer until the end of the planning horizon is a preferred timing
strategy.
Table 5.32. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Three Selected Transfer Initiation Years
(1, 6 and 9)
Change in
Total after-tax wealth, $
(as percent of the first year of two that
are being compared)
 Total before-tax wealth, $
 Transfer tax savings, $

Transfer initiation Transfer initiation
year 1 compared
year 6 compared to
to year 6
year 9
-333,673
-128,965
(5.13%)
(1.88%)
-333,673
0

-163,056
34,091

Note: Absolute values for terminal wealth used to compute calculations are provided in Appendix G.

According to the numerical results presented in tables 5.33 and 5.34, the early transfer
initiation significantly reduces the firm’s growth: significantly higher consumption
withdrawals under the earlier transfer initiation (43 percent higher annually) reduce the
retained earnings, and a slightly better income generating ability of the firm (on average
0.59 percent higher net income annually) is not able to compensate for the large
consumption withdrawals.
Table 5.33. Comparison of the Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation
Year 1 versus Year 6
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years Production years
1-6
7 - 10
Retained earnings
-114.04
-15.28
Net income
0.59
-4.74
Consumption withdrawals
43.39
0.00
Joint farmer productivity
0.01061
0.00
Total assets
-1.55
-4.95
Total income and self-employment taxes
-4.44
-5.29
The firm’s ability to capitalize on higher joint farmer productivity and income tax
savings improves the income generating ability of the firm, but the reduction in the firm’s
asset base (due to large consumption withdrawals) offsets this benefit. Thus, the net
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improvement in income generating ability is not large enough to offset consumption
withdrawals.
When comparing transfer initiation years later in the planning horizon (year 6
versus 9), the firm still experiences a drastic decline in retained earnings (on average 77
percent lower retained earnings annually) if transfer is initiated earlier (in year 6
compared to year 9).
Table 5.34. Comparison of Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation Year
6 versus Year 9
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years Production years
1-6
7 - 10
Retained earnings
0.00
-77.62
Net income
0.00
0.55
Consumption withdrawals
0.00
37.74
Joint farmer productivity
0.00
0.00
Total assets
0.00
-1.21
Total income and self-employment taxes
0.00
-4.02
As shown in Table 5.34, the decline is caused by the same factors as in the
analysis of transfer initiation year 1 versus 6: the improvements in income generating
ability of the business (0.55 percent higher annually) cannot offset a large increase in
withdrawals (37.74 percent higher annually).
As mentioned earlier, altering the farmland price assumption did not change the
directionality of results but altered their magnitude compared to the baseline scenario. If
the assumed behavior of farmland prices indeed takes place, the firm will generate
$538,108 less in terminal wealth if transfer is initiated in year 1 compared to the baseline
scenario.
In this case, the difference in terminal wealth results from the adjustments in
owner equity and the firm’s asset base associated with the changes in farmland prices that
occurred under scenario 4.
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Table 5.35. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Transfer Initiation Year 1
Baseline Scenario
Scenario 4
Total after-tax wealth, $
7,034,441
6,496,333
7,034,441
6,496,333
 Total before-tax wealth, $
0
0
 Transfer tax savings, $
Total change in valuation equity, $
0
-1,510,053
 During production years 1 – 5
0
1,228,660
 During production years 5 - 10
The total downward adjustment in valuation equity of $1,510,053 in the first five
years of the planning horizon reduces the firm’s asset base and thus its future income
generating ability and borrowing capacity which results in the firm’s lower growth and
lower terminal wealth. The upward adjustments occur later in the planning period, but
they are smaller in magnitude ($1,228,660) and do not offset the reduction in wealth that
has already taken place.
The analysis allowed for drawing the following conclusions:
1.

Compared to the baseline scenario, relaxing the assumption on the farmland
prices as specified under this scenario: (1) reduces the magnitude of results for
both types of transition strategy, and (2) alters the directionality of results if
proactive transition strategy is employed.

2.

Irrespective of the type of transition strategy, delayed transfer is always
preferred because transfer tax savings (if any) are not large enough to offset the
reduction in the firm’s growth associated with the earlier transfer timing.

3.

It is important to note that adjustments in the firm’s asset and equity positions
associated with the changes in farmland prices under this scenario reduce the
firm’s growth (compared to the baseline scenario) and thus, result in an overall
lower magnitude of results. If a proactive transition strategy is employed, the
total before-tax wealth to be transferred to the younger generation at the end of
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the planning horizon does not exceed the estate and gift tax exemption amount;
thus, no tax is paid under any transfer initiation year in this case.
5.5 Scenario Five
Proactive Transition Strategy
Relaxing the assumption of constant farmland prices and applying a more
optimistic farmland market outlook changes the magnitude of the results and slightly
alters the directionality compared to the baseline scenario. Under this scenario, initiating
the transfer between years 4 and 6 results in the highest terminal wealth, peaking at
transfer initiation in year 4.
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Figure 5.11. Discounted Terminal Wealth as a Function of Transfer Initiation Year
As shown in Table 5.36, initiating the transfer before year 4 reduces the firm’s growth
($108,933 less in total before-tax wealth) and does not provide significant tax savings (at
that size of estate, only $31,329) to justify the amount of wealth foregone. However,
delaying the transfer beyond year 4 (for example, year 9) results in significantly higher
tax obligations.
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Table 5.36. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Three Selected Transfer Initiation Years
(1, 4 and 9)
Transfer initiation Transfer initiation
Change in
year 1 compared
year 4 compared to
to year 4
year 9
Total after-tax wealth, $
-77,604
55,680
(as percent of the first year of two that
(1.06%)
(0.75%)
are being compared)
-108,933
-126,037
 Total before-tax wealth, $
31,329
181,718
 Transfer tax savings, $
Note: Absolute values for terminal wealth used to compute calculations are provided in Appendix G.

Thus, when comparing transfer year 4 to 9, the amount of tax savings ($181,718) due
to earlier transfer initiation offsets the reduction in total before-tax wealth of $126,037,
resulting in a higher total after-tax wealth. This suggests that delaying the transfer beyond
year 4 will reduce the level of terminal wealth in the business.
Table 5.37. Comparison of the Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation
Year 1 versus Year 4
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years Production years
1-4
5 - 10
Retained earnings
-43.11
-4.04
Net income
-0.26
-1.31
Consumption withdrawals
17.90
0.00
Joint farmer productivity
0.01598
0.00
Total assets
-0.33
-1.41
Total income and self-employment taxes
-0.38
-1.42
Results provided in tables 5.37 and 5.38 show that earlier transfer initiation under
this scenario (comparing transfer initiation year 1 to 4, and year 4 to 9) always reduces
the firm’s growth and thus, results in a lower total before-tax wealth. The slowdown in
growth occurs because earlier initiation (1) imposes higher consumption withdrawals on
the business and (2) weakens the income-generating ability of the business. For example,
comparing transfer initiation year 1 to 4, the increase in joint farmer productivity
associated with the early transfer initiation (on average 0.01598 percent higher annually
in the first four years of the planning period) and income tax savings (0.38 percent lower
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income taxes paid every year under transfer year 1 compared to year 4) cannot offset the
impact of the decline in the asset base on the income-generating ability of the business.
Table 5.38. Comparison of the Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation
Year 4 versus Year 9
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years Production years
1-4
5 - 10
Retained earnings
0.00
-36.56
Net income
0.00
-0.81
Consumption withdrawals
0.00
16.63
Joint farmer productivity
0.00
0.00
Total assets
0.00
-0.93
Total income and self-employment taxes
0.00
-1.12
The slowdown in the firm’s growth in the second part of the planning horizon
under the earlier transfer initiation year (year 4 compared to year 9) is explained by the
same argument as used for the comparison of year 1 and 4. The numerical results for this
comparison are provided in Table 5.38.
Table 5.39. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Transfer Initiation Year 1
Baseline
Scenario
6,998,955
6,998,955
0

Scenario 5

Total after-tax wealth, $
7,317,399
7,317,399
 Total before-tax wealth, $
0
 Transfer tax savings, $
Total change in valuation equity, $
0
-1,142,319
 During production years 1 – 4
0
1,626,952
 During production years 5 - 10
Decomposition of equity in production year
10, %
6,918,566
6,915,871
80,389
80,055
 Beginning year equity
0
321,437
 Change in retained earnings
 Valuation equity
Ending equity in production year 10, $
6,998,955
7,317,399
Compared to the baseline scenario, these results suggest a slightly earlier transfer
initiation time (year 4 compared to year 6). Under the baseline scenario, the firm shows
stronger financial performance (higher retained earnings) throughout the planning
horizon, but the terminal wealth under the baseline scenario is lower than under scenario
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5 for all transfer initiation years. This is a result of the fact that under scenario 5, under
any transfer initiation year, the difference in the terminal wealth in the firm comes from a
significant appreciation in farmland values in the last production year (year 10, as
assumed in the model), increasing the size of estate compared to the baseline scenario.
Thus, earlier transfer initiation years under scenario 5 offer higher transfer tax savings
because of a larger size of estate compared to the baseline. It is important to note that this
change in the terminal wealth is not driven by the variation in the firm’s performance
under different scenarios. The difference in terminal wealth is rather the outcome of the
changes in the farmland market.
Regular Transition Strategy
Initiating transfer earlier (in year 1 versus 5, and year 5 versus 9) results in lower terminal
wealth in the firm suggesting that the delayed transfer is preferred.
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Figure 5.12. Discounted Terminal Wealth as a Function of Transfer Initiation Year
As shown in Table 5.40, the earlier transfer initiation provides some transfer tax
savings, and the magnitude of savings increases as the transfer initiation moves further
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towards the end of the planning horizon ($133,754 of transfer tax savings if initiated the
transfer in year 1 versus 5, and $181,464 if initiate the transfer in year 5 versus 9).
Table 5.40. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Three Selected Transfer Initiation Years
(1, 5 and 9)
Transfer initiation Transfer initiation
Change in
year 1 compared
year 5 compared to
to year 5
year 9
Total after-tax wealth, $
-159,074
-39,029
(as percent of the first year of two that
(2.16%)
(0.52%)
are being compared)
-292,828
-220,493
 Total before-tax wealth, $
133,754
181,464
 Transfer tax savings, $
Note: Absolute values for terminal wealth used to compute calculations are provided in Appendix G.

However, the transfer tax savings associated with earlier transfer are not large
enough to offset the firm’s reduced growth and thus, as a result, the amount of total
before-tax wealth foregone (if initiated earlier).
Thus, the net result of the trade-off between the reduction of firm’s growth and
increase in transfer tax savings suggest that the delay in transfer initiation is preferred
since it yields a higher discounted terminal wealth position in the business.
Table 5.41. Comparison of the Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation
Year 1 versus Year 5
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years
Production years
1-5
6 - 10
Retained earnings
-97.70
-10.25
Net income
1.03
-3.77
Consumption withdrawals
41.82
0.00
Joint farmer productivity
0.01272
0.00
Total assets
-1.09
-3.81
Total income and self-employment
-3.83
-3.87
taxes
The numerical results presented in tables 5.41 and 5.42 give additional insight
into how the firm’s growth changes under different transfer initiation years. Early transfer
always reduces the firm’s growth as was shown in Table 5.40. Comparing transfer
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initiation year 1 and 5, the improved income generating ability of the business does not
justify higher consumption withdrawals. Under transfer earlier initiations, the income
generating ability is improved due to a higher joint farmer productivity (on average
productivity is higher by 0.01272 in the first part of the planning horizon) and substantial
income tax savings (on average 3.83 percent lower per year).
These two factors together offset the impact of the decline in total assets (1.09
percent lower) on the firm’s income generating ability. Thus, the net effect is positive,
and the earlier initiation improves the income generating ability of the business under this
scenario and for the selected transfer initiation years that are being compared.
Table 5.42. Comparison of the Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation
Year 5 versus Year 9
Average Change, %
Change in
Production Years
Production years
1-5
6 - 10
Retained earnings
0.00
-66.10
Net income
0.00
0.90
Consumption withdrawals
0.00
40.44
Joint farmer productivity
0.00
0.00
Total assets
0.00
-1.49
Total income and self-employment
0.00
-5.29
taxes
If comparing transfer initiation years later in the planning horizon (year 5 and 9),
the same outcome is observed: earlier transfer reduces the firm’s growth since the
improvements in income generating ability of the business (0.9 percent higher) cannot
justify the given consumption withdrawals (40.44 percent higher). Thus, earlier transfer
reduces the firm’s retained earnings, its growth and thus the total before-tax wealth.
Under scenario 5, the firm grows slower than under the baseline scenarios due to
changes in the firm’s asset base (declined by $1,145,433 in the first four production years
and increased by $1,635,698 in the rest of the planning period) and thus lower income
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generating ability. However, as reported in Table 5.43, the total before-tax wealth is
higher under scenario 5 than under the baseline scenario.
A closer look in the firm’s year-to-year financial performance shows that the
increase in terminal wealth under scenario 5 compared to the baseline scenario is driven
mainly by the increase in valuation equity in the last year of the planning horizon caused
by the increase in farmland values. For example, under scenario 5, at the beginning of
year 10, the firm has only $918 more in total equity compared to the baseline. However,
at the end of that year, the total before-tax wealth in the business under scenario 5
exceeds the total before-tax wealth under the baseline by over $300,000, given that the
firm generated lower retained earnings ($80,988 under scenario 5 compared to $81,234
under the baseline scenario).
Table 5.43. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Transfer Initiation Year 1
Baseline
Scenario 5
Scenario
Total after-tax wealth, $
7,034,441
7,358,365
7,034,441
7,358,365
 Total before-tax wealth, $
0
0
 Transfer tax savings, $
Total change in valuation equity, $
0
-1,145,433
 During production years 1 – 4
0
1,635,698
 During production years 5 - 10
Decomposition of equity in production year 10,
%
6,953,207
6,954,125
81,234
80,988
 Beginning year equity
0
323,251
 Change in retained earnings
 Valuation equity
Ending equity in production year 10, $
7,034,441
7,358,365
This decomposition indicates that the increase in terminal wealth is driven only by
the appreciated value of farmland in the last period, and not the firm’s performance.
The following concluding thoughts summarize the analysis provided above:
1. Comparing to the baseline: relaxing the assumption on farmland prices as
specified in scenario 5 does not change the preferred timing strategy for firms that
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employ regular types of transition strategy but suggests a slightly earlier transfer
for those that follow proactive transition strategy (year 4 compared to year 6).
2. In the latter case, a slightly earlier initiation is preferred because under this
scenario the firm generates higher (in nominal terms) total before-tax wealth
regardless of the transfer initiation year than under the baseline scenario, and thus
earlier years provide higher transfer tax savings that drive the transfer timing
decision.
3. Finally, the higher total before-tax wealth (in nominal terms) under scenario 5
compared to the baseline scenario is driven primarily by a favorable farmland
market outlook in the last several years of the planning horizon and not by the
firm’s improved performance. Indeed, the firm had stronger financial
performance under the baseline scenario but generated a higher total before-tax
and after-tax wealth (in nominal terms) under scenario 5 due to a large
appreciation of equity in the last production year of the planning horizon.

5.6 Scenario Six
Proactive Transition Strategy
Aggressive gifting does not change the preferred timing of transfer initiation, but
slightly alters (by no more than $12,000) the magnitude of the firm’s terminal wealth
(under all transfer initiation years) compared to the baseline scenario. Figure 5.13 shows
that initiating the transfer in year 6 results in the highest terminal wealth position under
both scenarios.
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Figure 5.13. Discounted Terminal Wealth as a Function of Transfer Initiation Year
As shown in Table 5.44, the early transfer initiation (year 1 compared to year 6)
provides low transfer tax savings ($1,759) that are not sufficient to compensate for the
reduction in the firm’s growth ($125,500) associated with the early transfer.
Table 5.44. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Three Selected Transfer Initiation Years
(1, 6 and 9)
Change in
Total after-tax wealth, $
(as percent of the first year of two that
are being compared)
 Total before-tax wealth, $
 Transfer tax savings, $

Transfer initiation Transfer initiation
year 1 compared
year 6 compared to
to year 6
year 9
-123,741
41,090
(1.77%)
(0.58%)
-125,500
1,759

-44,598
85,688

Note: Absolute values for terminal wealth used to compute calculations are provided in Appendix G.

However, delaying the transfer initiation beyond year 6 imposes significant tax
obligations (compared to the earlier transfer) which exceed the increase in firm’s growth
associated with the delayed transfer. Thus, the net effect suggests year 6 as a preferred
timing of transfer initiation since it allows for the largest discounted terminal wealth
position.
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Table 5.45. Comparison of Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation Year
1 versus Year 6
Change in

Average Change, %
Production Years
Production years
2-6
7 - 10
-31.59
-7.95
-0.51
-2.29
19.15
1.74
0.0205811
0
-0.49
-0.49
-0.784
-1.58

Retained earnings
Net income
Consumption withdrawals
Joint farmer productivity
Total assets
Total income and self-employment
taxes
Table 5.45 and 5.46 suggest that early transfer always reduces the firm’s growth

under this scenario due to: (1) lower income generating ability of the firm, and (2) higher
consumption withdrawals. If the initiation takes place between years 1 and 6, the firm can
capitalize on the farmer’s higher productivity in early years, but the increases in net
income associated with higher joint productivity index do not justify the reduction in
asset base as a result of a high consumption withdrawals under earlier transfer initiation
assumptions.
Table 5.46. Comparison of Firm’s Key Financial Variables under Transfer Initiation Year
6 versus Year 9
Change in

Average Change, %
Production Years
Production years
1-6
7 - 10
0.00
-14.35
0.00
-0.22
0.00
10.89
0.00
0
0.00
-0.48

Retained earnings
Net income
Consumption withdrawals
Joint farmer productivity
Total income and self-employment
taxes
The above discussion shows that aggressive gifting does not alter the preferred

timing strategy; however, it slightly affects the level of terminal wealth compared to the
baseline scenario. As shown on Figure 5.13, until transfer initiation year 5, aggressive
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gifting results in lower terminal wealth in the firm: for example, if the transfer is initiated
in year 1, terminal wealth is $11,786 lower under scenario 6 compared to the baseline
scenario.
Based on results from Table 5.47, the difference in terminal wealth results solely
from different firm growth rates under the two scenarios given that terminal wealth
positions under neither of these scenarios trigger transfer taxes. A closer look into the
firm’s performance under these two scenarios for transfer year 1 provide several
important insights.
Table 5.47. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Transfer Initiation Year 1
Difference
Baseline
between
Change in
Scenario 6
Scenario
Baseline and
Scenario 6
Total after-tax wealth, $
6,998,955
6,987,169
11,786
6,998,955
6,987,169
11,786
 Total before-tax wealth, $
- Owned by the older
5,066,871
4,650,767
416,104
generation, $
0
396,000
-396,000
 Total taxable gifts, $
5,066,871
5,046,767
20,104
 Total taxable estate, $
0
0
0
 Transfer tax obligation, $
First, income generating and saving abilities of the business improve slightly at
the beginning of the planning horizon, but then deteriorate under scenario 6 compared to
the baseline scenario. The improvement in the firm’s performance in the early period is
primarily due to the firm’s ability to capitalize on a higher productivity of the younger
generation33 and to capture some income tax savings resulting from the rapid shift of
income to the younger generation’s lower tax bracket, under scenario 6 compared to the
baseline scenario. As shown in Appendix E, the deterioration of the firm’s performance

33

This is due to larger weights on the younger generation’s productivity index compared to the baseline
scenario where shares are changing slower than under scenario 6 due to a less aggressive shifting of wealth.
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in the second part of the planning horizon under scenario 6 results from two major
factors: higher level of family living expenses of the younger generation in the last
production year and trade-offs between reduction in income taxes and increases in selfemployment taxes. Under scenario 6 compared to the baseline, the younger generation
moves into the range with a higher level of family living expenses in the last production
year (year 10) since a more rapid shift of wealth helped younger generation to move from
the size of operation 1 to 2 (as specified in Table 1, Appendix D) which increased
consumption withdrawals in year 10 by $7,243. In addition, the aggressive gifting helps
reduce income tax obligations by shifting income more rapidly to the younger
generation’s lower income tax rate; however, potential increases in self-employment
taxes can offset the savings in income taxes and indeed increase the tax obligations when
aggressive gifting is used. As shown in Table 1 in Appendix E, in the first part of the
planning horizon, the firm generated higher gross revenue and net income under
aggressive gifting strategy: for example, in production year 2, scenario 6 yielded $36
higher income before tax compared to the baseline but resulted in $16 lower tax
obligations (income and self-employment) as shown in Table 2, Appendix E. As shown
in Table 3, decomposing the taxes that were paid in this production year under two
scenarios gives the following insights: the firm paid $248 less in income taxes but $231
more in self-employment taxes under scenario 6 compared to the baseline. Thus, overall,
the aggressive gifting in this year resulted in lower total income and self-employment
taxes (by $16). In the second part of the planning horizon, however, under scenario 6 the
firm generated $57 less in income before-tax (compared to the baseline), but paid $1,415
more in total income and self-employment taxes. Tables 4 and 5 help explain this
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phenomenon. Both generations pay identical rate on self-employment tax (15.3 percent).
By construction of the tax itself, an individual pays 12.4 percent of Social Security tax on
the first $118,000 of their income and 2.9 percent of Medicare tax on the remaining
amount of income (above the $118,000 threshold). If the income is below 118,000, a total
of 15.3 percent tax is applied to the whole amount. For this representative farm, the
younger generation’s income does not exceed $118,000, while the older generation’s
income is above that threshold. Thus, every dollar that is shifted from the older to the
younger generation is being taxed at 15.3 percent instead of only 2.9 percent when under
the older generation’s income bracket. Even though these changes are very small in
absolute value, they provide important intuition into the economic drivers that impact the
timing of the transfer initiation and need to be further studied.
As mentioned earlier, if the transfer is initiated after year 5, aggressive gifting
yields to a slightly higher terminal wealth. For example, if initiated in year 6, scenario 6
results in $2,159 higher terminal wealth compared to the baseline scenario (Table 5.48).
Table 5.48. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Transfer Initiation Year 6
Baseline
Scenario

Scenario 6

Difference
between
Baseline and
Scenario 6
-2,159
-136

Total after-tax wealth, $
7,108,751
7,110,910
7,112,533
7,112,669
 Total before-tax wealth, $
- Owned by the older
5,459,455
5,278,398
181,058
generation, $
0
176,000
-176,000
 Total taxable gifts, $
5,459,455
5,454,398
5,057
 Total taxable estate, $
3,782
1,759
2,023
 Transfer tax obligation, $
Based on the results provided in Table 5.48, aggressive gifting slightly increases
the firm’s growth (the difference in total before-tax wealth is $149 between scenario 6
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and the baseline scenario) when transfer is initiated later in the planning horizon (e.g.,
year 6).
The difference in terminal wealth primarily comes from lower transfer tax savings
associated with the aggressive strategy (by $2,023). Only $136 of the difference results
from the firm’s higher growth under scenario 6 compared to the baseline scenario.
Regular Transition Strategy
As shown on Figure 13, the aggressive strategy does not change the preferred
timing of transfer initiation and only slightly alters the terminal wealth position (by no
more than $2,200) if a regular transition strategy is employed by the firm.
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Figure 5.14. Discounted Terminal Wealth as a Function of Transfer Initiation Year
Similarly to the results for the proactive transition strategy, the aggressive gifting
almost does not alter firm’s growth compared to the baseline scenario. The difference in
total before-tax wealth is $101 and the majority of the difference in terminal wealth
between these two scenarios comes from transfer tax savings associated with the
aggressive gifting strategy.
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Table 5.49. Comparison of Selected KOVs for Transfer Initiation Year 6

Change in
Total after-tax wealth, $
 Total before-tax wealth, $
- Owned by the older
generation, $
 Total taxable gifts, $
 Total taxable estate, $
 Transfer tax obligation, $

7,243,380
7,310,398

7,245,578
7,310,499

Difference
between
Baseline and
Scenario 6
-2,198
-101

5,617,544
0
5,617,544
67,017

5,436,302
176,000
5,612,302
64,921

181,242
-176,000
5,242
2,096

Baseline
Scenario

Scenario 6

Note: Absolute values for terminal wealth used to compute calculations are provided in Appendix G.

The above analysis results in the following conclusions:
1. Regardless of the type of transition strategy, aggressive gifting does not change
the preferred timing strategy compared to the baseline scenario.
2. A more aggressive shifting of wealth to the younger generation helps reduce
income tax obligations, however, these savings can be offset by an increase in the
self-employment taxes paid as a result of a higher level of income generated by
the younger generation due to the construction of the self-employment tax. For
details, please see the analysis above.
3. Shifting wealth more aggressively also implies that the younger generation
approaches a higher range of family living expenses34 more rapidly and will
withdraw more funds from the business to cover their consumption.
4. Finally, by definition and construction of gifting tax, aggressive gifting (beyond
the tax-free gifting amount) does not reduce the transfer taxes paid. However,
recognizing that aggressive gifting shifts not only current wealth but also future

34

To populate family living expenses, this study uses a methodology that bases these expenses on two
major variables: the age of the head of the household and the size of their operation.
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profits allows a reduction in the taxable estate by redirecting more profits to the
younger generation, thus reducing the amount of total before-tax wealth owned by
the older generation and transfer taxes.
5.7 Summary of Results
The previous section provided a detailed discussion of the analysis for each scenario
and offered an economic intuition for the observed results. The comparative analysis,
however, was mainly done for various transfer initiation years within each scenario or
between each individual scenario and the baseline. A brief overview of the summary of
results across all scenarios is provided below using radar charts and supporting
discussions.
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Figure 5.15. Depiction of Preferred Timing of Transfer Initiation for All Scenarios and
Both Types of Transition Strategy
Note: numbers on the gridlines indicate the transfer initiation year, with “10” representing “no transfer
initiation”

Appendix F provides information for comparative analysis across all scenarios
and for both types of transition strategies and includes: (1) preferred timing of transfer
initiation, (2) dollar value of terminal wealth for the preferred transfer initiation years
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under each scenario, and (3) major economic drivers of the timing decisions for the
transfer initiation.
Figure 5.15 shows preferred timing of transfer initiation under each scenario for
both types of transition strategy (proactive and regular). The center circle represents the
earliest transfer initiation timing (year 1) and the farther away circles – the delayed
transfer, with year 10 representing no transfer initiation. This figure provides three
important insights. First, generally, when a proactive transition strategy is used, the
preferred timing of the transfer initiation occurs earlier than under the regular transition
strategy (under all scenarios, except scenario 4). Second, under the proactive transition
strategy, the firm’s preferred timing is responsive to a greater number of assumptions
made in the model compared to the case under the regular transition strategy. Visually
this can be observed in the following way: under regular transition strategy (denoted by
the red line on the figure), the preferred timing has changed only when the first three
assumptions were relaxed (assumptions on the availability of off-farm income and the
level of consumption withdrawals from the business for the younger generation’s family
living expenses). If a proactive transition strategy is used (denoted in a blue line),
relaxing assumptions under all scenarios (except scenario 6) changes the preferred timing
of transfer initiation.
Finally, the largest magnitude in the response of the baseline scenario to the
assumptions relaxed is observed under scenarios 1 and 2 irrespective of transition
strategies. This observation is not surprising because the above analysis showed that high
consumption withdrawals are a major driver of the firm’s reduced growth and contributed
to or drove the later transfer initiation years. These scenarios assume that the
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consumption withdrawals from the business are much lower compared to the baseline 35
which when applied to the model improves the firm’s growth and increases total beforetax wealth. The latter factors, in their turn, increase tax savings associated with the early
transfer suggesting to initiate the transfer earlier than under the baseline.
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Figure 5.16. Depiction of Terminal Wealth Positions in Preferred Transfer Initiation
Years for Each Scenario and Both Types of Transition Strategy
Note: numbers on the gridlines indicate the dollar value of terminal wealth, rounded to the first decimal and
discounted back to the beginning of year 1.

Figure 5.16 presents and compares dollar value of terminal wealth position in the
preferred transfer initiation year by each scenario and type of transition strategy. For
example, under the baseline scenario the preferred transfer initiation year (year 6 and no
transfer initiation for proactive and regular strategies respectively) allows the firm to
generate a terminal wealth around $7 million. If a regular transition strategy is employed,
the firm will generate a slightly higher terminal wealth ($7.08 million) compared to a
lower ($6.94 million) terminal wealth if the firm follows a proactive transition strategy.

35

For explanation of scenarios, see the section on Description of Scenarios in Chapter 3.
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This visual representation of results provides two major observations: (1) if the firm
employs a proactive transition strategy, it generates a lower terminal wealth position
compared to the situation when the regular strategy is followed (blue circle lies
completely within the red circle), and (2) most of terminal wealth positions are located
around the second from the outside circle ($7 million mark) with the exception of two
scenarios. Irrespective of the type of transition strategy, scenario 1 yields the largest
terminal wealth and scenario 4 the lowest. The highest terminal wealth position under
scenario 1 is explained by the firm’s higher growth under this scenario compared to other
scenarios (due to lower consumption withdrawals associated with the availability of offfarm income), while the lowest terminal wealth observed under scenario 4 results from
downward adjustments in the firm’s asset bases and equity positions due to changes in
farmland prices.
Another important point of discussion is the economic drivers of the preferred
timing of farm transfer initiation. In most cases the earlier transfer normally reduces the
firm’s growth. The only exceptions to this generalization are: scenarios 1 and 2 when a
proactive transition strategy is used, and scenario 1 under a regular transition strategy. In
these particular three cases, the firm’s improved income generating ability associated
with the early transfer was not offset by high consumption withdrawals placed on the
farm if earlier transfer takes place. Relaxing the assumption on the availability of offfarm income (scenario 1) or assumption on the portion of the younger generation’s
consumption covered by the farm business reduces the amount of consumption
withdrawals and thus increases the firm’s retained earnings and future periods’ earnings
and savings. The resulting higher terminal wealth triggers large transfer taxes if the
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transfer is delayed. Therefore, the earlier transfer under these scenarios: (1) improves the
firm’s growth and (2) provides significant tax savings. Under the baseline scenario, the
firm exhibits higher income generating ability36 if the transfer is initiated earlier, but high
consumption withdrawals placed on the farm business (according to the assumption of
the baseline scenario) suppress the saving ability of the firm and thus reduce the firm’s
growth.
Based on the summary of results provided in Appendix F, in most cases, both
factors - firm’s growth and transfer tax savings - impact the decision on the preferred
timing of the transfer initiation. The results suggest that under the proactive transition
strategy, the preferred timing is primarily driven by transfer tax savings. If a regular
transition strategy is employed, the opposite observation is made: the reduction in growth
rate associated with earlier transfers generally has a greater impact on the preferred
timing of the transfer initiation than the tax savings. This difference between two types of
transition strategy results from the assumption on the construction of total consumption
withdrawals from the business prior to the transfer initiation. The younger generation is
not allowed to withdraw funds until the transfer is initiated, thus, earlier initiation
imposes some significantly higher consumption withdrawals which is not justified by the
improvements in the firm’s growth. Under the proactive transition strategy, the difference
between consumption withdrawals before and after the transfer initiation is lower (in
absolute magnitude)37 and thus, reduces the firm’s growth compared to the regular
strategy.

36
37

When regular transition strategy is employed.
Compared to that value under the regular strategy.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSIONS
The delay of farmer retirement and lack of succession planning in the U.S.
agriculture sector create growing concern about the intergenerational farm transfer,
particularly in the last decade due to the aging farmer population, highly-elevated
farmland prices and increasing capital investments in the production agriculture sector.
Past works have studied the above aspects of this issue; however, the gap in the literature
and research remains when it comes to the impact of timing of farm transfer initiation on
the firm’s financial performance and future continuity. In addition, the presence of lifecycle patterns in farmer productivity and consumption was found in the past research but
these findings have never been applied in the intergenerational farm transfer modelling.
This study recognizes that farm businesses that have the goal of remaining in a family
have multiple operators (the older and younger) from two different generations and their
respective family units. Therefore, according to the findings from the literature, these
life-cycle differences can be critical for the firm’s growth particularly when the business
prepares for and undergoes the intergenerational transfer.
This study fills the existing gap in the literature by presenting a conceptual
framework and empirical farm-level model of wealth creation and accumulation that
incorporates the life-cycle patterns of farmer productivity and consumption to analyze
how the timing of farm transfer initiation impacts the terminal wealth in the business.
Serving as a basis of the model, a set of three dynamic financial statements appropriately
linked within a year and over time (1) reflect the process of wealth creation, (2)
incorporate the impact of life-cycle patterns in farmer productivity and consumption on
wealth accumulation, and (3) account for the imposed decision variables.
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The results for a representative large coarse grain farm (corn-soybean operation)
confirm that the timing of the transfer is determined by two major tradeoffs: first,
between the younger generation’s productivity and consumption withdrawals and,
second, between the firm’s growth and transfer taxes. The analysis also suggests that the
preferred timing of transfer initiation depends on the type of the transition strategy
employed.
Under the baseline scenario, irrespective of the type of the transition strategy
employed, the earlier transfer reduces the firm’s income generating and savings abilities
resulting in the firm’s slower growth. In other words, if no off-farm income is available,
the cost of bringing the younger generation (additional consumption withdrawals)
outweighs the benefits (additional gross revenue generated due to a higher joint farmer
productivity and potential income tax savings resulting from the shifting of income into a
lower tax rate/bracket), and thus reduces the firm’s growth, suggesting to delay the farm
transfer initiation. The earlier initiation has a greater (negative) impact on the firm’s
growth if the regular transition strategy is used (compared to the case of proactive
transition strategy) due to the assumptions on the consumption withdrawals under each
type of strategy. The difference in consumption withdrawals before and upon transfer
initiation for farms that employ the regular strategy is much larger than for the proactive
strategy. That is why the earlier transfer reduces the firm’s growth more rapidly under the
regular strategy than under the proactive strategy.
However, when the trade-off between the firm’s growth and transfer tax
obligations is taken into consideration, the results suggest initiating the transfer in year 6
if the proactive strategy is followed and delaying the transfer if the regular transition
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strategy is used. Under a proactive transition strategy, prior to year 6 transfer tax savings
do not justify the firm’s growth foregone due to early transfer, but delaying the initiation
beyond year 6 imposes transfer tax obligations which exceed the higher growth
associated with the later initiation years. Therefore, initiating the transfer in year 6
provides the maximum terminal wealth in the firm. Under the regular transition strategy,
transfer tax savings do not justify the reduction in the firm’s growth under any transfer
initiation year, thus the results suggest avoiding the initiation during the 10 year planning
horizon and transferring the wealth via final transfer tool. Thus, the results under the
baseline scenario show that the optimal transfer initiation timing depends on the absolute
difference between the firm’s reduced growth and potential transfer tax savings.
Sensitivity analysis was conducted to test the responsiveness of the results to the
following key assumptions: (1) the level of consumption withdrawals by the younger
generation (by allowing the availability of off-farm income (Scenario 1) or allowing only
a partial (50 or 80 percent) coverage of the younger generation’s family living expenses
by the farm business (Scenario 3 and 4), (2) farmland prices (by imposing a more
pessimistic farmland outlook -Scenario 4- and a less pessimistic farmland outlook Scenario 5), and (3) the level of annual gifting (allowing a more aggressive annual gifting
– Scenario 6).
Sensitivity analysis shows that relaxing the assumption on the availability of offfarm income changes the magnitude and directionality of the results compared to the
baseline scenario. If the off-farm income is available to support the younger generation’s
consumption, the early transfer initiation results in the firm’s higher growth and larger tax
savings regardless of the type of transition strategy (proactive or regular); thus, earlier
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transfer is preferred under both types of transition strategy. When no off-farm income is
available and the farm covers only a portion of the younger generation’s family living
expenses (50 or 80 percent), the preferred timing of transfer initiation gradually moves
away from the results under scenario 1 (with off-farm income) to the results under the
baseline scenario (no off-farm income and full coverage of the younger generation’s
family living expenses by the farm business). These results also match the insights
obtained from scenario 1: as the consumption withdrawals taken out from the business to
cover the younger generation’s family living expenses decrease, the earlier farm transfer
initiation is preferred.
Relaxing the assumption on farmland prices (scenarios 4 and 5) shows that
changes in the land market reduce the terminal wealth for all considered cases in this
study and alter the preferred strategy when the proactive transition strategy is employed.
The impact of the pro-longed and moderate decline in farmland prices (under scenario 4)
on the firm’s financial performance, terminal wealth and thus preferred timing of farm
transfer is twofold. First, significant and prolonged declines in farmland prices devalue
the firm’s asset base which reduces its income generating ability and thus future growth
and total before-tax wealth. Second, the firm also experiences a decline in equity position
due to a prolonged downward adjustment in farmland values (because of a negative
change in valuation equity). Thus, the above mentioned factors lower the taxable estate
and thus the level and/or likelihood of transfer taxes. Therefore, if these conditions hold,
the results suggest not initiating the transfer during the planning horizon (or further
delaying the transfer) irrespective of the type of transition strategy followed. A more
optimistic farmland outlook (scenario 5) results in lower terminal wealth positions
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compared to the baseline scenario irrespective of the transfer initiation year or the type of
the transition strategy. As for the preferred timing strategy, under this scenario, a slightly
earlier transfer initiation is preferred when the firm employs the proactive transition
strategy (year 4 compared to year 6 under the baseline scenario). This is due to the fact
that under this scenario the firm generates higher (in nominal terms) total before-tax
wealth than under the baseline scenario and thus, earlier years provide higher transfer tax
savings suggesting year 4 instead of year 6 as a preferred timing of transfer initiation.
Testing the responsiveness of the results to the level of annual gifting shows that
aggressive gifting does not change the preferred timing of farm transfer initiation for this
representative farm. The results suggest that using a more aggressive gifting strategy
provides the firm with benefits but can potentially impose extra costs. The benefits as
discussed in the analysis include the firm’s ability (1) to better capitalize on the higher
productivity of the younger generation in the first period of the planning horizon, (2) to
generate some income tax savings as a result of a more rapid shift of wealth to the
younger generation with a lower income tax rate, and (3) to shift the firm’s future
earnings more rapidly than under the normal gifting. The potential costs associated with a
more aggressive gifting strategy are (1) larger consumption withdrawals taken out from
the farm business to cover higher family living expenses of the younger generation and
(2) potentially higher self-employment taxes paid by the younger generation that reduce
or offset the income tax benefits associated with a more aggressive gifting strategy.
It is critical to acknowledge that the changes in terminal wealth between the
transfer initiation years and/or scenarios found in this study are small if put in relative
terms and range between 0.75% and 5.63% for this representative farm. However,
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changes in key input variables used to populate the model (such as size of asset base,
operating and financial efficiency, off-farm income, age of older and younger operators,
and perceived productivity of both generations) can change the magnitude of results. For
example, higher asset turnover ratio or higher off-farm income available to cover the
younger generation’s consumption can potentially change the firm’s growth, total beforetax wealth and thus transfer tax obligations and timing of transfer initiation. An example
of this scenario is a commonly used business strategy where a grain farm adds an
additional enterprise unit that does not require large capital investments but allows for a
quick generation of cash flow to support the farm’s liquidity position (such as a hog
operation). This approach allows the older generation to bring the younger generation
into the business and capitalize on their higher productivity without large additional
withdrawals from the business, on the one hand, and take advantage of transfer tax
savings associated with the early transfer initiation, on the other hand.
Another important fact to consider is that the analysis was conducted assuming
that the older generation has only one transfer tax exemption amount. As discussed in
Chapter 2 current legislation allows for transferring the unused estate and gift exemption
amounts between spouses. Thus, if the older generation (a couple) has total of $10.9
million, given the representative farm’s size of estate, the transfer tax would not have
triggered under any of the scenarios (including the baseline scenario). Thus, only under
scenario 1 (when the off-farm income is available) would the early transfer still be
preferred since earlier initiation improves the firm's growth and results in higher total
before-tax (and in this case, after-tax) wealth. Under all other scenarios, earlier transfer
initiation results in lower firm’s growth or the preferred timing was driven by the transfer
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tax savings associated with the early transfer. Thus, under all these scenarios (the
baseline and scenarios 2 - 6), when no tax savings are available and given that the early
transfer initiation reduces the firm’s growth, the results suggest to delay the transfer
initiation as it allows to generate a higher terminal wealth position in the business.
As discussed in detailed in Chapter 5, given the initial age of the operators (at the
beginning of the planning horizon) and the assumed age differential between the
generations, a very small difference in the farmer productivity is observed between the
two operators. For the representative farm used in this study, the younger generation's
productivity is higher only in the first four production years of the planning horizon, and
after that year, both operators exhibit identical productivity. Thus, it is important to note
that the earlier transfer initiation would allow the firm to better capture a higher
productivity of the younger generation (for more years and larger difference between the
generations) and thus improve the firm's income generating ability.
Finally, according to the farm tax experts and agricultural lending specialists,
large farm businesses utilize multiple business ownership structure for different types of
assets to minimize tax obligations and ease the transfer process of those assets from the
older to the younger generation. The business ownership structure is hypothesized to
have an impact on the key output variable, but testing the response of the preferred timing
of the farm transfer initiation to changes in this assumption is left for future research due
to the complexity of its construction.
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CHAPTER 7: IMPLICATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
A careful examination of the results and their comparison across scenarios
(Appendix F) shed light on several key implications of this study. First, the availability of
off-farm income allows farm business to bring the younger generation in the business
earlier and still generate higher terminal wealth compared to the wealth position when the
transfer is delayed (as shown in Scenario 1). It is critical to mention that when off-farm
income is available, the early transfer initiation triggers higher transfer taxes but also a
significantly higher growth rate of the firm which offsets the impact of higher transfer
taxes resulting in a higher terminal after-tax wealth. This observation proves that both
generations should focus on generating additional income stream and utilizing the
business equity more effectively rather than minimizing transfer taxes only. If the latter is
the only goal of both generations, the course of actions undertaken by the operation will
result in a lower level of terminal after-tax wealth reducing the likelihood of the firm’s
future continuity.
Second, while this study reveals some valuable insights into the timing decisions
for the intergenerational farm transfer, it is crucial to address two exogenous variables
that have strong and direct impact on the timing decision of the farm transfer initiation
(farmland prices and the regulatory environment). The model confirms that the transfer
decisions are heavily dependent on the expectations about the farmland prices. Their
importance is due to the fact that changes in farmland values can create sudden and often
large upward or downward adjustments of farms’ equity positions directly changing the
taxable estate and thus the potential transfer tax obligations. The regulatory environment
surrounding the estate taxes (tax rates and exemption limits) has important implications
on the results of this research. If the tax rate is increased to 45 percent and the exemption
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limit is reduced down to $3.5 million per individual as proposed by democratic party, the
issue of loss of person and business wealth during the farm transfer and future continuity
of farm businesses will be even a greater issue to the farms of the size analyzed in this
study and will have implications on smaller farms as well.
The applicability of this research is two-fold. First, these results will serve as a
basis to develop a case study to be used in farmer workshops on farm finances,
succession planning, as well as in agribusiness management classrooms. Second, the
model developed in this study eventually can be converted in a decision-making tool that
will help producers make more informed decisions related to succession planning and
farm transfer.
Finally, recognizing the limitations of the study helps determine the areas for
further research and analysis that will make the results of the study more accurate and
robust. The limitations of this study are identified in the following three areas: (1)
improving the parameters used in the model, (2) addressing the deterministic nature of
the model, and (3) attempting to quantify and incorporate in the model the impact of
“soft” factors on the success of the farm transfer process and its future continuity. The
farmer productivity parameters used in the model were taken from the existing empirical
studies. Further work in this area will add value to the existing model since the existing
parameters were estimated more than a decade ago prior to a spike in farm capital
investments which might have altered the farmer productivity. In addition, instead of
focusing on famer productivity (technology use and/or efficiency), it might be
worthwhile to invest future research time into identifying an alternative measure of
farmer productivity for financial models (e.g., farmer’s efficiency of asset utilization by
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age rather than productivity). Another existing limitation of this study – deterministic
nature - must be addressed by introducing stochastic components to certain endogenous
and exogenous variables in the model such as farmland values, off-farm income, etc.
Finally, this research recognizes the importance of the “soft”, intangible factors on the
decision-making related to the intergenerational farm transfer; however, none of them
were incorporated in this model and thus were left for future research. While still difficult
to be quantified, it is crucial for future research to attempt to quantify the impact of such
“soft” issues as disputes between siblings that lead to the unexpected and forced buyout
of off-farm heirs.
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APPENDIX A. FINANCIAL FLOWS IN THE MODEL

Beginning of period 1

Balance Sheet
Assets
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Equity

IncomeStatement
Gross Revenue
Operating & Financial Exp.
Tax
Net Income

Age

Statement of Owner Equity,
Beginning Equity
Net income
Household Consumption
CHANGE IN RE
Valuation Equity
Ending equity
(1) % owned by older gen.
(2) % owned by young gen.
End of period 1 &
Beginning of period 2

Balance Sheet
Assets
Liabilities
Equity

Figure 1. Financial Flows in the Model
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Figure 2. Impact of Decision Variables on Financial Flows
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APPENDIX B. STATISTICAL TESTS FOR EQUITY OD SAMPLES.
PRODUCTIVITY INDICES
Table 1. Variance Ratio Test, Iowa and Nebraska
Variable

Observations

Mean

Iowa sample, equity
90
6,172,080
Nebraska sample, equity
46
5,516,804
: sd (Iowa sample, equity)/ sd Nebraska sample, equity) = 1
F statistic = 2.3345
Degrees of freedom = 89, 45

Standard
Error
160,091
146,559

Table 2. Two-Sample t Test with Unequal Variances, Iowa and Nebraska
Standard
Variable
Observations
Mean
Error
Iowa sample, equity
90
6,172,080
160,091
Nebraska sample, equity
46
5,516,804
146,559
: mean (Iowa sample, equity)/ mean Nebraska sample, equity) = 0
t statistic = 3.0191
Satterthwaite’s degrees of freedom = 125.856

Standard
Deviation
1,518,765
994,011

Standard
Deviation
1,518,765
994,011

Table 3. Farmer Productivity Index by Age (Tauer and Lordkipanidze 2000).
State
Age 25-34
Age 35-44
Age 45-54
Age 55-64
IA
1.24
1.10
1.07
1.14
IL
1.18
1.09
1.11
1.03
IN
1.30
1.23
1.23
1.13
KS
1.41
1.32
1.31
1.09
MI
1.07
1.10
1.07
0.95
MN
1.05
1.05
1.05
1.03
MO
1.35
1.12
1.16
1.15
ND
1.22
1.09
1.13
1.05
NE
1.26
1.21
1.17
0.97
OH
1.26
1.15
1.15
1.10
SD
1.15
1.09
1.09
1.08
WI
1.12
1.10
0.03
1.06
Average
1.22
1.14
1.13
1.07
Source: Tauer and Lordkipanidze 2000.
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APPENDIX C. FAMILY LIVING EXPENSES

90,000

U.S. Dollars

80,000
70,000
60,000
FINBIN

50,000

KS

40,000

KY

30,000
20,000

Years
Figure 1. Comparison of Family Living Expenses by Three Sources

120,000

U.S. Dollars

100,000
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Size 3
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Size 5
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0
30 and less

30-40

40-50

50-60

60 or over

Age Horizon
Figure 2. Comparison of Family Living Expenses by Farm Size over the Age Horizon
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APPENDIX D. FAMILY LIVING EXPENSES: LOOKUP TABLE
Table 1. Definition of Size Categories
Size Category
Size 1
Size 2
Size 3
Size 4
Size 5
Size 6

Value, acres
<250
251-500
501-1,000
1,001-1,500
1,501-2,000
2,001-5,000

Table 2. Family Living Expenses, 2013
Age group
Size 1
Size 2
Size 3
30 or
38,373
42,288
52,720
younger
31-40
50,646
57,469
66,658
41-50
58,912
57,804
74,139
51-60
55,947
54,777
74,128
60 or older
46,977
52,832
60,213
Source: FINBIN, report generated in April, 2015.

Size 4
58,543

Size 5
43,439

Size 6
52,023

83,421
84,519
81,430
71,254

89,974
75,282
75,282
72,721

71,307
100,086
97,865
74,034
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APPENDIX E. ADDITIONAL NUMERICAL EVIDENCE FOR SCENARIO 6.
Table 1. Comparison of Key Financial Variables Under Baseline and Scenario 6 for
Transfer Initiation Year 1.
Difference in
Production Retained
Consumption
Net
Gross
Income and SE
year
earnings
withdrawals
income
revenue
taxes
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
-67
0
-67
-149
16
3
-112
0
-113
-211
41
4
-134
0
-135
-181
75
5
-91
0
-92
-53
78
6
90
0
91
-69
-108
7
588
0
589
-54
-602
8
1,098
0
1,099
46
-1,088
9
1,472
0
1,473
235
-1,415
10
8,941
-7,243
1,698
487
-1,579
Table 2. Firm’s Performance in Production Year 2 Under Transfer Initiation Year 1:
Comparison Between Baseline Scenario and Scenario 6.
Baseline
Scenario 6
Difference
Gross revenue
1,095,539
1095688
-149
Operating and financing expenses
720,101
720,199
-98
Depreciation
107,285
107,300
-15
Income before-tax
268,189
-36
268,153
210,339
1,824
212,163
 Income before-tax, older
57,849
-1,860
55,988
 Income before-tax, younger
Income and SE taxes
103,794
103,778
16
Net income
271,644
271,711
-67
Ownership share, older generation
0.7912
0.7842
0.01
Ownership share, younger generation
0.2087
0.2157
-0.01

147

Table 3. Decomposition of Income and Self-Employment Taxes Paid in Production Year
2 Under Transfer Initiation Year 1, Comparison Between the Baseline Scenario and
Scenario 6.
Taxes in Production
Net
Baseline
Scenario 6
Difference
Year 2
change
Federal income tax
46,390
45,880
510
231
 Older
7,470
7,749
-279
 Younger
State income tax
17,238
17,074
163
16
 Older
3,342
3,490
-147
 Younger
Self-employment tax
20,784
20,731
52
-231
 Older
8,566
8,850
-284
 Younger
Table 4. Firm’s Performance in Production Year 9 Under Transfer Initiation Year 1:
Comparison Between Baseline Scenario and Scenario 6.
Baseline
Scenario 6
Difference
Gross revenue
1,172,045
1,171,810
235
Operating and financing expenses
770,388
770,234
154
Depreciation
114,778
114,755
23
Income before-tax
286,878
286,821
57
 Income before-tax, older
210,007
194,649
15,357
76,871
92,171
-15,299
 Income before-tax, younger
Income and SE taxes
111,164
112,579
-1,415
Net income
290,492
288,996
1,495
Ownership share, older generation
0.7320
0.6786
0.05
Ownership share, younger generation
0.2679
0.3213
-0.05
Table 5. Decomposition of Income and Self-Employment Taxes Paid in Production Year
9 Under Transfer Initiation Year 1, Comparison Between the Baseline Scenario and
Scenario 6.
Taxes in Production
Net
Baseline
Scenario 6
Difference
Year 2
change
Federal income tax
 Older
45,786
41,486
4,300
475
10,759
14,584
-3,824
 Younger
State income tax
17,044
15.665
1,379
5
 Older
5,089
6,462
-1,373
 Younger
Self-employment tax
20,722
20,276
445
-1,895
 Older
11,761
14,102
-2,340
 Younger
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APPENDIX F. COMPARISON OF RESULTS ACROSS SCENARIOS

Baseline

Proactive transition strategy
Major economic
Preferred
driver(s) of preferred
timing
timing
Year 6
Transfer years 1-6:
(Terminal
mostly growth rate
wealth:
Transfer years 7-9:
$7,108,751
growth rate and
)
transfer tax savings*

Regular transition strategy
Major economic
Preferred
driver(s) of preferred
timing
timing
Do not initiate
the transfer
($7,271,800)

Scenario 1

Year 1
($7,501,33
4)

Mostly transfer tax
savings

Year 1
($7,504,579)

Scenario 2

Year 2
($7,263,00
1)

Mostly transfer tax
savings

Year 3
($7,340,033)

Scenario 3

Year 5
($7,146,19
1)

Transfer years 1-5:
growth rate only.
Transfer years 6 – 9:
growth rate and
transfer taxes*

Year 9
($7,272,736)

Scenario 4

Do not
initiate the
transfer
($6,714,98
5)

Growth rate only

Do not initiate
the transfer
($6,964,252)

Year 4
($7,395,00
3)

Transfer years 1-4:
growth rate* &
transfer taxes
Transfer years 5-9:
growth rate & transfer
taxes*

Do not initiate
the transfer
($7,560,998)

Year 6
($7,110,91
0)

Transfer years 1-6:
growth rate* &
transfer taxes
Transfer years 7-9:
growth rate & transfer
taxes*

Do not initiate
the transfer
($7,271,800)

Scenario 5

Scenario 6

Growth rate* and
transfer tax savings
Transfer years 1-6:
Mostly transfer tax
savings.
Transfer years 6-9:
Growth rate and
transfer tax savings*
Transfer years 1-3:
Mostly growth rate
Transfer years 4-9:
Growth rate and
transfer tax savings*
Growth rate* and
transfer tax savings
Transfer years 1-6:
Growth rate only.
Transfer years 7-9:
Growth rate* and
transfer tax savings
Transfer years 1-4:
Growth rate* and
transfer tax savings.
Transfer years 5-9:
Growth rate and
transfer tax savings*

Growth rate* and
transfer tax savings

Note: asterisk denotes the driver that has a higher impact on the terminal wealth. The term “mostly” implies
that more than 90% of the difference in terminal wealth stems from that particular driver.
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APPENDIX G. ABSOLUTE VALUE OF TERMINAL WEALTH FOR TRANSFER
INITIATION YEARS DISCUSSED IN CHAPTER 5.
Table 1. Selected Output Variables Under Baseline Scenario, Proactive Transition Plan

Total after-tax wealth, $
Total before-tax wealth, $
Transfer tax, $
Average retained earnings, $
Average net income, $
Average consumption withdrawals, $

Transfer
Year 1
6,998,955
6,998,955
0
71,689
170,397
98,708

Transfer
Year 6
7,108,751
7,112,533
3,782
83,047
171,953
88,906

Transfer
Year 9
7,069,525
7,157,144
87,619
87,508
172,114
84,606

Table 2. Selected Output Variables Under Baseline Scenario, Regular Transition Plan

Total after-tax wealth, $
Total before-tax wealth, $
Transfer tax, $
Average retained earnings, $
Average net income, $
Average consumption withdrawals, $

Transfer
Year 1
7,034,441
7,034,441
0
75,237
170,575
95,338

Transfer
Year 6
7,243,380
7,310,398
67,017
102,833
171,543
68,710

Transfer
Year 9
7,266,196
7,446,351
180,155
116,429
170,238
53,809

Table 3. Selected Output Variables Under Scenario1, Proactive Transition Plan

Total after-tax wealth, $
Total before-tax wealth, $
Transfer tax, $
Average retained earnings, $
Average net income, $
Average consumption withdrawals, $

Transfer
Year 1
7,501,334
7,501,334
0
121,927
175,506
53,579

Transfer
Year 6
7,374,581
7,501,067
126,485
121,900
175,480
53,579

Transfer
Year 9
7,302,568
7,499,627
197,059
121,756
175,335
53,579
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Table 4. Selected Output Variables Under Scenario1, Regular Transition Plan

Total after-tax wealth, $
Total before-tax wealth, $
Transfer tax, $
Average retained earnings, $
Average net income, $
Average consumption withdrawals, $

Transfer
Year 1
7,504,579
7,505,418
839
122,335
175,055
52,720

Transfer
Year 6
7,378,369
7,506,636
128,266
122,457
172,226
49,769

Transfer
Year 9
7,298,541
7,493,704
195,164
121,164
170,238
49,074

Table 5. Selected Output Variables Under Scenario 2, Proactive Transition Plan

Total after-tax wealth, $
Total before-tax wealth, $
Transfer tax, $
Average retained earnings, $
Average net income, $
Average consumption withdrawals, $

Transfer
Year 1
7,262,867
7,262,867
0
98,080
173,057
74,977

Transfer
Year 4
7,260,517
7,262,985
2,469
98,092
173,069
74,977

Transfer
Year 9
7,140,647
7,261,620
120,973
97,955
172,933
74,977

Table 6. Selected Output Variables Under Scenario 2, Regular Transition Plan

Total after-tax wealth, $
Total before-tax wealth, $
Transfer tax, $
Average retained earnings, $
Average net income, $
Average consumption withdrawals, $

Transfer
Year 1
7,291,163
7,291,163
0
100,910
173,090
72,180

Transfer
Year 3
7,340,033
7,343,306
3,273
106,124
172,844
66,720

Transfer
Year 9
7,282,546
7,470,288
187,742
118,822
170,238
51,416
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Table 7. Selected Output Variables Under Scenario 4, Proactive Transition Plan

Total after-tax wealth, $
Total before-tax wealth, $
 Owned by older generation, $
Transfer tax, $
Average retained earnings, $
Average net income, $
Average consumption withdrawals, $

Transfer
Year 1
6,459,677
6,459,677
4,574,271
0
46,072
144,780
98,708

Transfer
Year 6
6,625,287
6,625,287
5,039,085
0
60,357
146,641
86,284

Transfer
Year 9
6,699,718
6,699,718
5,300,588
0
67,013
146,956
79,943

Table 8. Selected Output Variables Under Scenario 4, Regular Transition Plan

Total after-tax wealth, $
Total before-tax wealth, $
 Owned by older generation, $
Transfer tax, $
Average retained earnings, $
Average net income, $
Average consumption withdrawals, $

Transfer
Year 1
6,496,333
6,496,333
4,603,326
0
49,566
144,904
95,338

Transfer
Year 6
6,830,006
6,830,006
5,202,560
0
78,370
147,080
68,710

Transfer
Year 9
6,958,971
6,993,063
5,535,230
34,092
92,997
146,806
53,809

Table 9. Selected Output Variables Under Scenario 5, Proactive Transition Plan

Total after-tax wealth, $
Total before-tax wealth, $
 Owned by older generation, $
Transfer tax, $
Average retained earnings, $
Average net income, $
Average consumption withdrawals, $

Transfer
Year 1
7,317,399
7,317,399
5,225,288
0
55,070
153,778
98,708

Transfer
Year 4
7,395,003
7,426,332
5,528,323
31,329
63,925
155,245
91,320

Transfer
Year 9
7,339,322
7,552,370
5,982,619
213,048
74,687
156,051
81,364
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Table 10. Selected Output Variables Under Scenario 5, Regular Transition Plan

Total after-tax wealth, $
Total before-tax wealth, $
 owned by older generation
Transfer tax, $
Average retained earnings, $
Average net income, $
Average consumption withdrawals, $

Transfer
Year 1
7,358,365
7,358,365
5,257,804
0
58,603
153,941
95,338

Transfer
Year 5
7,517,439
7,651,194
5,784,386
133,754
82,323
156,179
73,856

Transfer
Year 9
7,556,468
7,871,687
6,238,046
315,218
101,723
155,533
53,809

Table 11. Selected Output Variables Under Scenario 6, Proactive Transition Plan

Total after-tax wealth, $
Total before-tax wealth, $
 owned by older generation, $
Amount of total taxable gifts, $
Total taxable estate
Transfer tax, $
Average retained earnings, $
Average net income, $
Average consumption withdrawals, $

Transfer
Year 1
6,987,169
6,987,169
4,640,767
396,000
5,036,767
0
70,510
169,943
99,432

Transfer
Year 6
7,110,910
7,112,669
5,278,398
176,000
5,454,398
1,759
83,060
171,966
88,906

Transfer
Year 9
7,069,820
7,157,267
5,624,619
44,000
5,668,619
87,448
87,520
172,126
84,606

Table 12. Selected Output Variables Under Scenario 6, Regular Transition Plan

Total after-tax wealth, $
Total before-tax wealth, $
 owned by older generation, $
Amount of total taxable gifts, $
Total taxable estate
Transfer tax, $
Average retained earnings, $
Average net income, $
Average consumption withdrawals, $

Transfer
Year 1
7,024,650
7,024,650
4,670,150
396,000
5,066,150
0
74,258
170,111
95,853

Transfer
Year 6
7,245,578
7,310,499
5,436,302
176,000
5,612,302
64,921
102,843
171,553
68,710

Transfer
Year 9
7,266,499
7,446,474
5,855,939
44,000
5,899,939
179,976
116,441
170,250
53,809

